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I. INTRODUCTION
In Indian country, the expansion of self-governance, the growth of the
gaming industry, and the increasing interdependence of Indian and nonIndian communities have intensified concern about the possible abuse of
power by tribal governments.1 As tribes gain greater political and economic
clout on the world stage, expectations have risen regarding the need for
greater government accountability in Indian country.2
Despite these expectations, Indian tribes are largely immune from
external accountability with respect to human rights. In fact, tribes have
effectively slipped into a gap in the global system of human rights
responsibility. The gap exists in the sense that tribal governments are not
externally accountable in any broad sense for abuses of human rights that
they commit.
This gap in the human rights system exists because tribes do not have
direct obligations under public international law, they are largely immune
from external accountability under the domestic law of the United States,
and they are frequently immune from judicial review within their own

1. DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL CHANGE AND CULTURAL CONTINUITY AMONG
NATIVE NATIONS 80 (2007); Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and
Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. REV. 48, 59–61 (2010) (arguing
that meaningful tribal sovereignty requires constraints against the potential abuse of
power).
2. Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and
the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 598, 621 (2010). See
generally Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049 (2007)
(arguing and theorizing as to greater tribal government accountability).
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systems of tribal law.3 Furthermore, there is no system apart from the
limited federal court review process that allows for external accountability
for Indian tribes.
The failure of the legal system to provide for tribal accountability for
human rights produces serious harms for Indian tribes and their polities. For
example, victims of human rights abuses are often unable to obtain a
remedy in any forum; their cases are frequently dismissed because of
sovereign immunity or lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4 In addition, the
inability of victims to vindicate their rights prevents tribal governments
from being held accountable for their actions and engaging in the reform
and development that accountability would foster. A third effect is that
dismissals create a growing unease with tribal sovereignty in the public,
increasing the risk that Congress or the courts will take steps to change the
law in a way that diminishes tribal prerogatives of self-government.5
Scholars have engaged in a great deal of debate over the appropriate
response to these dilemmas. Many have defended the current state of affairs
as a necessary form of collateral damage that respect for tribal sovereignty
must entail.6 Others have proposed providing individuals greater access to
the federal courts to litigate their claims.7 Commentators have also argued
that the United States bears responsibility under international law for the
human rights abuses inflicted by tribal governments.8 One scholar has
proposed the creation of an intertribal appellate court system with limited

3. See Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations
by American Indian Tribes, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 9 (2006); Riley, supra note
2, at 1111.
4. See id. at 11–13.
5. Florey, supra note 2, at 621; see also Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty
and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 829 & n.216 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Colin Miller, Banishment from Within and Without: Analyzing
Indigenous Sentencing Under International Human Rights Standards, 80 N.D. L. REV.
253, 276 (2004) (concluding after finding that the practice of banishment violates
international human rights norms that banishment should be allowed by indigenous
groups).
7. Austin Badger, Comment, Collective v. Individual Human Rights in
Membership Governance for Indigenous Peoples, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 485, 510–12
(2011); Eric Reitman, Note, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally
Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 VA. L. REV. 793, 858–
63 (2006).
8. Cowan, supra note 3, at 31–37; Greg Rubio, Reclaiming Indian Civil Rights:
The Application of International Human Rights Law to Tribal Disenrollment Actions, 11
OR. REV. INT’L L. 1, 32–36 (2009).
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jurisdiction over tribal membership determinations.9 I think that the time is
ripe for the creation of an intertribal human rights regime that includes the
formation of an intertribal treaty recognizing tribal human rights obligations
and establishing an intertribal institution with the capacity to address human
rights violations.
An intertribal human rights regime offers the best possible method of
providing external accountability for tribal abuses of human rights. This
approach has several advantages. It allows tribes to collectively respond to
the need for greater external accountability on their own terms, and it allows
human rights violations to be addressed without resorting to the
diminishment of tribes’ sovereign powers by the federal government. The
development and application of substantive human rights norms by tribes
also offer several benefits. They allow tribes to articulate and interpret
universal human rights in light of their cultural, philosophical, spiritual,
political, and social perspectives. Such a regime would also provide an
institutional forum to allow tribes to discuss and respond to the actions of
tribal governments that are accused of human rights violations.
Furthermore, such a regime would also act as a central resource that could
assist individual tribal governments with the task of adapting their domestic
legal systems to ensure that human rights norms are internalized, promoted,
and protected.
Part II of this Article describes tribal powers of self-government in order
to explain how tribes are capable of being human rights offenders. Part III
explains the reason for the existence of the human rights gap in Indian
country. It explains why tribes are shielded from federal court review of
most human rights abuses, why tribal legal systems do not provide effective
enforcement of human rights, and why tribes are not directly subject to
international human rights instruments. Part IV argues that the tribal
sovereignty doctrine should be modified from its present understanding to
one that accommodates external accountability for human rights violations.
Finally, Part V moves from theory to action by calling for the development
of an intertribal human rights treaty that will recognize human rights norms
and establish an institutional mechanism for enforcement.
II. TRIBES AS GOVERNMENTS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS
To understand why human rights are worthy of concern in Indian
country, it first helps to understand the fundamental aspects of tribal
sovereignty, sovereign immunity, and tribal powers of self-government.

9. Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, If You Build It, They Will Come: Preserving
Tribal Sovereignty in the Face of Indian Casinos and the New Premium on Tribal
Membership, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 311 (2010).
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Ultimately, this discussion will underscore the point that Indian tribes have
significant powers over the lives of individuals, and these powers have the
potential to be used, as well as abused, just as in any other governmental
context.10
A. A Primer on Tribal Sovereignty
Together with the federal government and the states, Indian tribes
constitute one of three kinds of sovereigns in the United States.11 Tribes,
however, are unique in that their existence predates the arrival of European
colonial governments. Therefore, they possess original and inherent rights
of self-government that are not derived from the federal government and
that have never been extinguished.12 Although the Constitution refers to
Indians twice, the Constitution does not define the rights of tribes.13 For
this reason, other sources of law, such as treaties, statutes, and federal
common law, must be considered together with history to understand the
status of tribes in the United States and the contours of their sovereignty.
From the earliest contact with Europeans until 1871, the Indian tribes
of North America entered into hundreds of treaties with colonial
governments, including treaties with the Dutch, British, French, and
Spanish colonists, as well as with the young government of the United
States. 14 These treaties recognized that tribes were distinct political
communities capable of exercising the powers of self-government and

10. Stephen Cornell et al., The Concept of Governance and Its Implications for
First Nations 10 (Native Nations Inst. & Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev. Joint
Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, Paper No. 2004-02, 2004), available at http://
www.jopna.net/pubs/jopna_2004-02_Governance.pdf (claiming that all government
power is subject to abuse and that societies need effective and culturally appropriate
rules to protect society from the misuse of power).
11. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal
Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997).
12. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978) (criminal jurisdiction
over members).
13. DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 9 (2001).
14. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (2006)) (stating, in a rider inserted into the Act, that “hereafter no Indian
nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may
contract by treaty: Provided, further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to
invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified
with any such Indian nation or tribe” (emphasis omitted)).
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capable of entering into relations with the United States.15 The treaties
entered into between tribes and the United States were binding obligations
of the federal government ratified by the Senate.16
This treaty-making history forms the backdrop to the foundational
cases of federal Indian law that are now called the “Marshall trilogy.”17
Although criticized on numerous grounds,18 many of the principles of
federal Indian law articulated by Chief Justice Marshall continue to have
vitality in the law today. These include the principle that Indian tribes are
“domestic dependent nations”19 that constitute “distinct, independent,
political communities” 20 capable of exercising the powers of selfgovernment. However, the opinions also recognized that tribes no longer
possess full independence. Rather, the powers of the tribes were “necessarily
diminished” because of their dependence on the superior power of the
United States.21 As an incident to their dependence, tribes were deemed
to have lost the power to engage in foreign relations, and they lost the
power to alienate their property to anyone other than the United States.22
Furthermore, Congress is deemed to have the power to further diminish
tribal powers, although this authority is tempered by the duty of the
federal government to protect tribal interests pursuant to what is now
termed the “trust relationship.”23 Although tribes were deemed to have
lost important powers of external sovereignty, they were also deemed to
retain possession of internal rights of self-government.24
Since the Marshall trilogy, tribal sovereignty has been deemed to be
diminished in additional ways. The Supreme Court has held that Congress
possesses plenary power in Indian affairs,25 meaning that it has full
15. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556–57, 559 (1832).
16. See id. at 556. But see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)
(affirming Congress’s power to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties by congressional
enactment).
17. Those cases are Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
18. Vine Deloria, Jr., Indian Law and the Reach of History, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 1
(1978); Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (1989).
19. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
20. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
21. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
22. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (citing Oneida Indian
Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667–68 (1974); Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at
559; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17–18; Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574; and Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 147 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring)).
23. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
24. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71–72 (1978) (tribal
membership); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 603–04 (1916) (domestic
relations); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 29 (1899) (inheritance rules).
25. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
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authority to legislate with respect to Indian tribes, even to the point of
terminating federal recognition of tribes.26 In more recent decades, the
Supreme Court has adopted the common law doctrine of implicit
divestiture.27 Under this doctrine, the Court may hold that tribal
governments no longer possess certain powers because they are inconsistent
with their dependent status.28 The implicit divestiture doctrine has been
used to hold that tribes no longer possess criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians in Indian country or civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on nonIndian land unless they enter into consensual relations with Indian tribes
or people or threaten the political integrity, economic security, health, or
welfare of tribal communities.29
B. Introduction to Tribal Sovereign Immunity
An essential aspect of tribal sovereignty is sovereign immunity. Just
as in other non-Indian law contexts, sovereign immunity shields a tribe
from suit unless it provides its consent.30 In the case of Indian tribes,
however, Congress is also deemed to have the power to waive or abrogate
tribal immunity from suit.31
The powerful significance of the federal common law doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity is illustrated in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.32
In that case, a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo attempted to
challenge a pueblo law that prohibited children whose fathers were not
enrolled in the pueblo from becoming members themselves.33 The
pueblo law allowed the children of male members of the pueblo whose
mothers were not members to enroll in the tribe.34 The plaintiff, Julia
Martinez, filed a lawsuit in federal court claiming that the pueblo’s law
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and ancestry in violation of

26. Cf. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408, 416 (1968)
(assuming congressional authority to terminate the federal-tribal trust relationship).
27. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
28. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
29. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at
212.
30. E.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998);
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
514 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63–64 (1978).
31. Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 523 U.S. at 759.
32. 436 U.S. 49.
33. Id. at 49.
34. Id.
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the equal protection provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),
passed by Congress in 1968.35 The ICRA imposes Bill of Rights-like
protections on Indian country, prohibiting tribal governments from
violating certain civil and political rights, such as the right to freedom of
speech, the right to due process, the right to equal protection of the law,
and the right not to be deprived of one’s property without compensation.36
After the district court entertained the suit and held that the pueblo
violated Martinez’s civil rights and the court of appeals upheld that
determination, the Supreme Court reversed.37 In its analysis, the Court
held that the pueblo had sovereign immunity, and Congress, in passing
the ICRA, did not broadly waive tribal immunity for enforcement in the
federal courts.38 The Supreme Court held that “Indian tribes have long
been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers,”39 and “a waiver of sovereign
immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’”40
Since Santa Clara Pueblo, the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine has
continued to be upheld by the federal courts. Although the Supreme
Court stated that the doctrine “developed almost by accident,”41 that the
earliest precedents form “but a slender reed”42 for supporting the doctrine,
and that “[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom” of the rule,43 the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is nevertheless entrenched in the
federal common law, and the Supreme Court has declared that it will
defer to Congress rather than repudiate or limit the doctrine itself.44 With
these reservations, the Court nevertheless held that sovereign immunity
shielded the Kiowa Tribe from suit in a commercial suit brought pursuant to
the tribe’s default on a note that was signed on off-reservation lands.45
Today, Indian tribes view sovereign immunity as serving a critical
function in promoting their exercise of self-government and their pursuit
of economic development activities. Without sovereign immunity, lawsuits
against tribal governments and their economic enterprises could place
tribal assets at risk, including those that fund public safety, public
infrastructure, health facilities, and services for the poor, elderly, and
35. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, §§ 201–203, 82 Stat. 77, 77–78 (1968)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006)).
36. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
37. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 53–55.
38. Id. at 58–59.
39. Id. at 58.
40. Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
41. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998).
42. Id. at 757.
43. Id. at 758.
44. Id. at 758–59.
45. Id. at 760.
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children. In a form of compromise, many tribes agree to limited waivers
of immunity in particular contexts.46 Such waivers are common in
specific contractual agreements.47 Although rarer, some tribes have also
enacted statutes that provide for limited waivers of immunity for certain
classes of tort claims.48 In other cases, tribal courts have issued opinions
that hold that sovereign immunity is waived for the vindication of
constitutional rights.49 Tribal courts have also held that suits against
government officials can proceed on Ex Parte Young-type theories.50
C. Tribal Powers of Self-Government
Despite the fact that the federal common law holds that tribes are no
longer “possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty,”51 they continue
to possess important aspects of self-government. In United States v.
Wheeler, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes “are unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory . . . . [They] are a good deal more than private, voluntary

46. See Riley, supra note 2, at 1112; Edward Rubacha, Construction Contracts
with Indian Tribes or on Tribal Lands, 26 CONSTRUCTION LAW., Winter 2006, at 12, 12–
14.
47. See Amelia A. Fogleman, Note, Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes: A Proposal
for Statutory Waiver for Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1345, 1370 (1993).
48. E.g., TULALIP TRIBES OF WASHINGTON CODES & REGULATIONS, ORDINANCE
122.1 (2004), available at http://narf.org/nill/Codes/tulalipcode/tulalip122torts.htm
(establishing a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to provide a remedy for persons
injured by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of the tribe or its agents); 6 GRAND
TRAVERSE BAND CODE § 104 (2009) (providing for a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity for certain classes of injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of
certain tribal officers or caused by the condition of Gaming Commission property);
Tribal Torts Claims Act, Law and Order Code of the Fort McDowell Yavapai
Community §§ 22-401 to -406 (2000).
49. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at
Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 480–83 (1998) (reviewing cases where tribal courts
concluded that sovereign immunity was waived for ICRA claims); cf. Peter Nicolas,
American-Style Justice in No Man’s Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 959 (2002) (“A number
of tribal courts have held that ICRA does not abrogate a tribe’s sovereign immunity in
tribal court and have declined to entertain suits brought against tribes under ICRA.
Accordingly, even for violations of ICRA, injured parties find themselves without a
forum in which to adjudicate their claims against these tribes.” (footnote omitted)).
50. E.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 173 (1977) (“[T]he
successful assertion of tribal sovereign immunity in this case does not impair the
authority of the state court to adjudicate the rights of the individual defendants over
whom it properly obtained personal jurisdiction.”).
51. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
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organizations.”52 The general rule of the common law is that tribes
continue to possess their original powers of self-government, except for
those “withdrawn by treaty or statute” or “by implication as a necessary
result of their dependent status.”53
Tribal self-government powers that had been affirmed in earlier
precedents were also enumerated in the original publication of Felix S.
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law in 1941. That text states that
Indian self-government includes:
[T]he power of an Indian tribe to adopt and operate under a form of
government of the Indians’ choosing, to define conditions of tribal
membership, to regulate domestic relations of members, to prescribe rules of
inheritance, to levy taxes, to regulate property within the jurisdiction of the
tribe, to control the conduct of members by municipal legislation, and to
administer justice.54

In the decades since Cohen’s handbook was originally published, the
Supreme Court has continued to affirm tribal powers of self-government
over internal matters.55
D. The Parameters of Tribal Jurisdiction
A major issue that frequently surrounds the exercise of tribal powers
of self-government is the extent and scope of tribal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
is at the core of tribal sovereignty because it is a precondition to the
ability of a tribe to execute, apply, or enforce its laws. Tribes often
struggle to defend their adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction against
assertions of competing or concurrent jurisdiction by the states and by
the federal government. The scope and boundaries of tribal jurisdiction
are defined by statutes and federal common law, although the resulting
body of law has a patchwork character that leaves many ambiguities and
that creates fertile ground for frequent litigation.
The scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction has a modicum of legal
certainty, so it serves as a useful starting point for discussing tribal
jurisdiction. In general, Indian tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by non-Indians.56 They do, however, possess

52. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id.
54. FELIX S. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 122 (1945).
55. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978); Wheeler, 435
U.S. at 322–23.
56. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978).
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jurisdiction over all crimes57 committed by Indians if the crime occurs in
Indian country.58 Their jurisdiction is exclusive if the crime involved
both an Indian perpetrator and Indian victim, and the crime is not one
included in the Major Crimes Act.59 If the crime involves an Indian
perpetrator and a non-Indian victim, the tribe shares concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal government.60 Also, tribal criminal jurisdiction extends
to nonmember Indians as well as members.61 In cases where a nonIndian commits a crime in Indian country, exclusive federal jurisdiction
exists if the victim is Indian.62 If the perpetrator and the victim are both
non-Indian, then the state and possibly the federal government have
jurisdiction over the case.63 This last scenario is the only instance where
the state can exercise criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. In 2010,
Congress enhanced tribal criminal jurisdiction by passing the Tribal Law
57. Although some have maintained that the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction over Major Crimes Act crimes committed by an Indian, the Ninth Circuit has
held that tribes do share concurrent jurisdiction over such crimes. See Wetsit v. Stafne,
44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995).
58. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324. Jurisdictional questions in Indian law often turn on
whether land satisfies the legal definition of “Indian country.” Indian country is defined
in 18 U.S.C § 1151. The statute defines Indian country as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). The Major Crimes Act vests the federal government
with criminal jurisdiction over any Indian who commits any of the following major
crimes:
[M]urder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A
[rape and related offenses], incest, assault with intent to commit murder,
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury . . . ,
an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years,
felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under
section 661 of [Title 18 of the U.S. Code] within the Indian country . . . .
Id.
60. Concurrent federal criminal jurisdiction in such cases is established by the
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(2006), and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
61. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).
62. Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152; Assimilative Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 13.
63. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
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and Order Act.64 The Act increases tribal court sentencing authority
from one to three years and elevates the ability to impose fines from
$5,000 to $15,000 where certain constitutional protections are met, such
as providing licensed, law-trained judges and providing appointment of
counsel for indigent defendants.65
The scope of tribal civil jurisdiction is more ambiguous. In general,
tribes possess civil jurisdiction over their members, but where nonmembers
are concerned, the Supreme Court has adopted a general presumption
against tribal jurisdiction unless certain exceptions apply.66 Under the
exceptions, tribes may regulate “the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements.” 67 Tribes may also
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians when their conduct “threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe.”68
Adjudicatory authority is important for tribes because it defines the
scope of tribal authority to resolve disputes affecting their lands and
people. Tribal courts have jurisdiction over civil cases arising in Indian
country involving a tribal member defendant, regardless of whether the
plaintiff is Indian or non-Indian.69 If the defendant is a nonmember, the
tribal court generally lacks jurisdiction unless one of the Montana
exceptions applies.70 If a nonmember challenges the exercise of tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction, the challenge can create federal question
jurisdiction to decide whether the tribal court is acting within the scope
of its jurisdiction.71 Such challenges, however, must first exhaust all
available remedies in the tribal court to provide the tribal court with the
first opportunity to evaluate the basis for the jurisdictional challenge.72
In addition, the Supreme Court has extended the tribal court exhaustion
64. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 123 Stat. 2261.
65. Id. § 234(a)(3) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (Supp. IV 2011)).
66. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
67. Id. at 565.
68. Id. at 566.
69. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
70. The Court found that the Montana exceptions were not satisfied in a series of
cases, resulting in the determination that the tribal court in each case did not have
adjudicatory jurisdiction. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008) (holding Montana exceptions inapplicable because the
tribe lacked civil authority to regulate land sales); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369
(2001) (holding Montana exceptions inapplicable to civil rights suit arising out of a
search executed in connection with an off-reservation crime); Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (holding Montana exceptions inapplicable because authority
over state highway accidents is not needed to preserve inherent tribal power).
71. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852
(1985).
72. Id. at 856–57.
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requirement to cases where diversity jurisdiction creates concurrent
federal and tribal court jurisdiction.73 In such cases, the federal courts
must stay their hand to give a tribal court a “full opportunity to
determine its own jurisdiction.”74
E. Tribal Self-Governance in Practice
In the Part above, I have described the legal meaning of tribal
sovereignty and sovereign immunity, the powers of self-government that
have been affirmed by court precedent, and the common law rules that
define the scope of tribal jurisdiction. This discussion has so far described
the de jure forms of tribal self-governance. What is missing, however, is
a de facto description of self-governance; that is, what tribes actually do
in the real world. The description that follows will provide a more
grounded basis for my claim that tribal governments bear responsibility for
human rights obligations.
For the 566 federally recognized Indian tribes in the United States,75
tribal sovereignty is more than an abstract legal concept documented in
the legal opinions of the Supreme Court. It is a force that brings power
and legitimacy to tribal governments in their everyday dealings in the
world.
Tribal governments today exist in a wide diversity of forms, and they
govern vastly different communities within different territories. In some
cases, government structures are similar to the United States’ threebranch system, while in others they are dramatically different. Some of
the more unique examples include pueblos that use a theocratic form of
government76 or tribes who legislate and decide disputes using a vote of
all of the adult members of the tribe in a general council format. The
land mass and populations of tribes also vary dramatically. The Navajo
Nation’s reservation is comparable in size to West Virginia or the

73. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
74. Id. (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
75. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,868 (Aug. 10, 2012) (listing 566
tribes).
76. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799,
844–45 (2007) (describing the theocratic governments of the Hopi, Pueblos, Onondaga,
and Meskwaki).
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Republic of Ireland, and its population exceeds 175,000.77 In contrast,
the Redding Rancheria in California has a land base of thirty acres and a
population of eighty-three people.78 Overall, there are just over one million
people living on reservations and trust lands in the United States, and
approximately 544,000 of these residents identify as American Indian or
Alaska Native alone or in combination with another race.79 This also
means that approximately 456,000 non-Indians live within the potential
reach of the civil jurisdiction of Indian tribes.80 The average population
of these areas is approximately 6,000, and the median population is
approximately 400; twenty-two reservations have a population greater
than 10,000 people.81
1. Law Enforcement
Indian tribes are the frontline defenders of peace and safety for
reservation communities. There are more than 200 police departments
operated by tribal governments in Indian country.82 Some police
departments employ a small number of officers, while the Navajo Nation
employs approximately 200 officers.83 A 2002 census prepared by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 84% of tribal justice systems in
the United States identified themselves as handling misdemeanor cases,
and seventy-one tribes reported that they operated their own detention
facilities.84 Approximately 207 tribes reported that they had agreements
77. HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF NATIVE NATIONS:
CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 6 (2008) [hereinafter
HARVARD PROJECT].
78. See Redding Rancheria v. Salazar, No. 11-1493 SC, 2012 WL 525484, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE TRIBES FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES: 2000, at 6
tbl.1 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phct18/index.html.
79. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 78. This figure includes the populations
reported by the 2000 U.S. Census for all reservations, off-reservation trust lands, and
rancherias. It does not include Alaska Native Village Statistical Areas, Tribal
Designated Statistical Areas, or Oklahoma Tribal Statistical Areas, nor does it include
other areas designated American Indian areas, such as Hawaii Homeland Areas, State
Designated Tribal Statistical Areas, or state reservations.
80. See id.
81. See The 2006–2010 ACS 5-Year American Indian & Alaskan Native Tables
Summary File Technical Documentation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://www2.
census.gov/acs2010_SPT_AIAN/AmericanIndianAlaskaNative/ACS_AIAN_SF_Tech
_Doc.pdf (used to generate population averages and medians in Excel document on file
with author).
82. HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 77, at 264.
83. Id. at 265.
84. B UREAU OF J USTICE S TATISTICS , C ENSUS OF T RIBAL J USTICE A GENCIES IN
INDIAN COUNTRY, 2002, at iii, 43 (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ctjaic02.pdf.
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to use local or county detention facilities for criminal defendants sentenced
to jail.85 These figures are likely increasing because the Bureau of Justice
Assistance has provided twenty-six grants to tribes in recent years to
build or renovate correctional facilities on their lands.86
2. Tribal Courts
Tribal courts handle a wide variety of civil as well as criminal matters.
Since 2002, when the Bureau of Justice Statistics identified 188 tribes
that operated a judicial system in the lower forty-eight states,87 the
number of tribal courts has grown substantially. Through federal financial
assistance programs such as the Tribal Court Assistance Program,88
Indian tribes have received approximately $45 million to plan, create, or
enhance their tribal courts.89 More than 282 tribes have received these
funds, indicating that the number of tribal courts in the United States
may have grown by close to one-third within the last decade.90
Most tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and as such, their
dockets include a wide variety of cases. Aside from criminal matters, a
typical tribal court is likely to hear cases on issues involving
constitutional law, civil rights, election law, and voting law.91 Tribal
courts also review cases involving domestic relations, including family
law and child welfare.92 Because tribes are often large employers, tribal

85. Id. at iii (“About two-thirds [of the 344 tribes responding] relied on local or
county agencies to provide a jail or detention facility.”).
86. BJA Programs: Correctional Facilities on Tribal Lands Program, BUREAU OF
JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=55 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012). The grant program is authorized under the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title II, Subtitle A, as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 et
seq. Id.
87. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 84, at iii; cf. Raymond D. Austin,
American Indian Customary Law in the Modern Courts of American Indian Nations, 11
WYO. L. REV. 351, 353 (2011) (“Two hundred and forty-eight American Indian tribes
have formal tribal court systems or court systems based on the American form of
courts.” (citing Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, BUREAU INDIAN AFF.,
http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm (last updated Sept. 27, 2012, 3:57 PM))).
88. 25 U.S.C. § 3681 (2006).
89. B.J. Jones, Tribal Courts Assistance Program (TCAP), U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/tribal/docs/fv_tjs/session_1/session1_presentations/Tribal_Courts
.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
90. Id.
91. MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 143–382 (2011).
92. Id. at 437–73.
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courts frequently adjudicate employment disputes.93 Property law issues
are also common in tribal court, including enforcement of probate law,
housing law, and law governing leasing and allotments.94 Furthermore,
tribal courts also adjudicate a number of commercial disputes, leading
them to apply contract and commercial law in many cases.95
The law applied in tribal courts comes from multiple sources. A tribal
court may need to apply and interpret provisions of a tribal constitution,
statute, or regulation. It may also apply the common law that has developed
from prior court decisions. In many instances, tribal courts also decide
cases by drawing upon the tribe’s traditional customary law.96 Although
exact numbers are not available, a large number of tribal courts also
apply rules of procedure and evidence that resemble procedural and
evidentiary rules used in non-Indian jurisdictions in the United States.97
Tribes often struggle with competing pressures to develop their justice
systems in ways that comport with their traditional practices versus
Western adversarial models. For some, the solution has been to develop
traditional courts or peacemaking systems in addition to adversarial

93. Id. at 692–710.
94. Id. at 475–530.
95. Id. at 531–71.
96. See, e.g., 4 B AY M ILLS T RIBAL C ODE § 401 (2004), available at http://
www.narf.org/nill/Codes/baymillscode/chapter04civilcases.htm (stating that the tribal
customs form part of the laws applied by the tribal court in civil actions); 2 BLACKFEET
TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE § 1 (1999), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/
blackfeetcode/blkftcode2 civil.htm (same); 9 COUSHATTA TRIBE OF LOUISIANA J UDICIAL
CODES § 1 (2004), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/couscode/coutitle9.htm
(same); 1 SAN ILDEFONSO PUEBLO CODE § 1.3 (1996), available at http://www.narf.org/
nill/Codes/sicode/sanildcodet1general.htm (stating that the Code “shall be interpreted
pursuant to the traditions and customs of the San Ildefonso Tribe”); see also Austin,
supra note 87, at 353 (describing Navajo Nation courts’ preference for Navajo
customary law); Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79
JUDICATURE 126, 126, 130 (1995) (explaining the concept of customary law); Ezra
Rosser, Customary Law: The Way Things Were, Codified, 8 TRIBAL L.J. 18, 18–19
(2008) (discussing tribal courts’ reliance on customary law). See generally RAYMOND D.
AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELFGOVERNANCE (2009).
97. B.J. JONES, ROLE OF INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2000),
available at http://www.icctc.org/Tribal%20Courts-final.pdf (“[M]any Indian tribal
courts mirror the justice systems that exist in states and the federal system and use very
similar procedures and rules.”). But see Jones’s further discussion:
Tribal courts are operated by Indian tribes under laws and procedures that the
Tribe has enacted or made one of their laws, which often differ from the laws
and procedures in federal and state courts. . . .
. . . [Some] Indian tribal courts have attempted to bring back traditional
dispute resolution techniques by adding these methods into their court systems.
As a result, these courts and their procedures may differ dramatically from the
procedures of a state or federal court.
Id.
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courts.98 This structure creates alternatives for the resolution of disputes
that often improve the efficiency and effectiveness of dispute resolution.
Although rare, some tribes elect not to adopt formal courts in favor of
the exclusive use of traditional decisionmaking bodies.99 In these cases,
the forum for resolution of disputes may consist of a tribal council or a
general council. A tribal council typically consists of the elected members
of the tribe’s lawmaking body, and a general council is usually made up
of all of the adult members of the tribe.100
3. Tribal Executive Functions
Just as any sovereign, Indian tribes are engaged in the process of
protecting and improving the welfare of their citizens as fully as possible.
Tribal governments pursue these aims through the creation and support
of a variety of institutions and through the execution of a wide variety of
tribal laws and policies. Aside from the tribal justice systems discussed
above, some of the most common institutions and agencies include those
that deal with cultural preservation, child welfare, tax revenues, economic
development, natural resources management, environmental protection,
land use, education, housing, and health.
4. Tribes as Owners of Commercial Enterprises and Employers
The economies of Indian tribes have grown at a rapid rate in recent
decades. Between 1990 and 2000, the real median household income

98. See, e.g., 1 CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE § 102 (1990),
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/chitimachacode/CCCJ_Title_IA_Chitimacha
_Peacemaker_Court.pdf (establishing a peacemaker court); O NEIDA INDIAN NATION
CODES & R ULES , P EACEMAKING R ULE 2 (2004), available at http://www.narf.org/
nill/Codes/oneidacode/peacemaking.htm (establishing a peacemaker court); 8 PIT RIVER
TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA CODE § 101 (2005), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/
pitrivercode/pitriverfamilych15youthreclam.htm (establishing a peacemaker program);
4 S TOCKBRIDGE -M UNSEE T RIBAL L AW P EACEMAKER O RDINANCE § 4.11, available at
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/stockmcode/4peacemaker.pdf (establishing a peacemaker
system for tribal community); see also JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION
TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 353 (2d ed. 2010) (providing an overview of peacemaking
approaches developed by various tribes).
99. See, e.g., Emmonak Juveniles and the Elders’ Group, A LASKA J UST . F.,
Summer 2001, at 1, available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/18/2summer2001/a_
emmonak.html (describing a tribal program that allows juvenile nonfelony cases to be
adjudicated through a body of elders).
100. See Reitman, supra note 7, at 813.
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within Indian areas in the United States grew between 24% and 33%.101
Despite these gains, however, American Indians continue to have the
highest rates of poverty relative to other racial groups in the United
States.102 The growth of economic indicators in Indian country is likely
connected to two important factors: economic diversification and tribal
self-government supported by the federal government’s policy of promoting
self-determination. Tribes today pursue economic development in a variety
of industries, including natural resources management, manufacturing,
hotels and resorts, tourism, financial services, media outlets, and retail
management and operation. The gaming industry has also exploded in
Indian country. In 1995, overall revenues from Indian gaming were
estimated to be $5.4 billion.103 By 2010, that figure had increased to $26.5
billion.104 The benefits of Indian gaming revenue are enjoyed only by a
small percentage of tribes, however. More than two-thirds of gaming
revenues in 2010 were earned by the top 17.6% of all Indian gaming
facilities.105 In that same year, 146 gaming operations, or more than
one-third of the total, took in just 2% of all Indian gaming revenue.106
As Indian economies have grown, so have the size of tribal payrolls.
Today, Indian tribes employ hundreds of thousands of Indians and nonIndians,107 and many tribes are the largest employers in their regions.108
In summary, tribal governments possess broad powers of selfgovernment over their internal affairs, and they engage in a variety of
101. HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 77, at 115.
102. Id.
103. Growth in Indian Gaming 1995–2004, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION,
http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/Tribal%20Data/growthinindiangamin
ggraph1995to2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
104. Growth in Gaming Revenues 2000–2010, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION,
http://www.nigc.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ta0m2dzcB3k%3d&tabid=67 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012).
105. NIGC Tribal Gaming Revenues 2006–2010, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION,
http://www.nigc.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=1P8h79gnJOU%3d&tabid=67 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012).
106. Id.
107. KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 503 (2008).
108. For example, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation employ
more individuals than nearly any other employer in north-central Washington State. The
President’s Fiscal Year 2012 Budget for Tribal Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 110 (2011) (statement of Hon. Michael O. Finley,
Chairman, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation). The Saginaw Chippewa
Tribe is also the largest employer in mid-Michigan. See Mark Ranzenberger, Tribe Is
Major Employer; More than 3,000 Workers Are Employed by Tribe in Isabella County,
MORNING SUN (Mar. 9, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://www.themorningsun.com/article/201
10309/FINANCE01/303099976/tribe-is-major-employer-more-than-3-000-workers-areemployed-by-tribe-in-isabella-county. With 4,777 employees, the Oneida Indian Nation is
also the largest employer in its two-county area in New York. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION,
2010 ANNUAL REPORT: INVESTING IN THE SEVENTH GENERATION 18 (2010).
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activities that impact many aspects of peoples’ lives. Through the decisions
and actions of their courts, government agencies, officers, and enterprises,
they exert powers over people that if abused have the potential to
severely impact the physical, economic, social, and cultural conditions of
peoples’ lives. This potential is no different from the potential for abuse
that lies in other governments. The difference, however, is that Indian
tribes are not externally accountable in any broad sense for their human
rights violations.
F. Tribes as Human Rights Violators
As the above discussion illustrates, Indian tribes have the power to do
tremendous good for their communities. However, just as with any other
government, tribes are also capable of abusing their powers and inflicting
harm on individuals. The harms alleged in Indian country are a breed
apart from the extreme depredations that are often associated with human
rights, such as torture, political executions, or forced disappearances.
However, the human rights claims in Indian country nevertheless implicate
a variety of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights that are
protected in existing international human rights instruments. In recent
years, several tribes have been publicly criticized for allegedly violating
human rights. The actions complained of have included race and sex
discrimination, failure to provide a fair and public hearing before an
independent and impartial tribunal, infringement of freedom of expression
and freedom of association, arbitrarily depriving individuals of their
property rights, and creating barriers to the right of individuals to freely
exercise their culture.109
109. See, e.g., Everglades Ecolodge at Big Cypress, LLC v. Seminole Tribe of Fla.,
836 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1300, 1308–09 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (dismissing on immunity grounds
allegations that tribe wrongfully canceled nonmember lease); Contour Spa at the Hard
Rock, Inc., v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 10 60483 CIV, 2011 WL 1303163 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 31, 2011) (similar facts), aff’d, No. 11-11997, 2012 WL 3740402 (11th Cir. Aug.
30, 2012); Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1458 (10th Cir. 1989)
(upholding summary judgment for tribe and tribal officials against plaintiffs denied
participation in tribal elections based on race); Cowan, supra note 3, at 40–43
(discussing various human rights violations by Indian tribes); Jessica Jones, Cherokee by
Blood and the Freedmen Debate: The Conflict of Minority Group Rights in a Liberal
State, 22 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 50 (2009) (discussing the Cherokee Nation’s alleged race
discrimination against the Cherokee Freedmen); Rebecca J. Tallent & Rubell S.
Dingman, Cherokee Independent Press Act of 2000, 35 J. COMM. INQUIRY 252 (2011),
available at http://jci.sagepub.com/content/35/3/252.full.pdf+html (discussing censorship of
tribal newspapers); Ann E. Tweedy, Sex Discrimination Under Tribal Law, 36 WM.
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In response to these charges of human rights abuses, criticism has
mounted against tribes from several sources. In some cases, federal
judges have openly expressed concern that tribal immunity from federal
court review leaves tribes free to engage in acts that are “deeply troubling
on the level of fundamental substantive justice.”110 In other cases,
legislators have responded to complaints of human rights abuses by
introducing legislation that would waive sovereign immunity, restrict
tribal powers of self-government, strip tribes of federal financial support,
or even terminate tribes.111 In still other cases, individuals have also formed
organizations that seek to publicize tribal abuse of power through public
education, rallies, and protests.112
The allegations of tribal abuse of individual rights and public criticism
against tribes have received increasing attention from media outlets,
public commentators, and academics alike. Many have criticized the harm
inflicted on individuals by tribes and have questioned whether tribal
sovereignty’s legal affirmation was achieved on the backs of women and
other oppressed individuals within tribal communities.113 At the same time,
however, perhaps an even larger contingent of commentators has remained
firm in its commitment to upholding tribal sovereignty against any
infringement, even if it means shielding tribal governments from external
review when they are accused of human rights violations.114
Also notable within this mix is the silence of Indian country’s tribal
government leaders that surrounds the accusations of human rights abuses
launched against their peers. In Indian country, the right to exercise selfgovernment without outside interference in connection with internal
domestic affairs is held sacrosanct. The flip side of this core legal
principle, however, is that tribal leaders within Indian country are loath
to criticize the actions of other tribes with respect to their own internal

MITCHELL L. REV. 392 (2010) (surveying tribal court sex discrimination cases); cf.
Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Liberalism and the Limits of Multiculturalism, 36 J. CANADIAN
STUD. 80 (2001) (alleging cultural discrimination by American pueblos in the
Southwest).
110. Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2005) (membership case).
111. See Edward D. Gehres III, Note, Visions of the Ghost Dance: Native American
Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse, 17 J.L. & POL. 135, 150 (2001).
112. Samantha Tipler, Protesters Invade Tribal Government, O R. PUB.
BROADCASTING (Oct. 26, 2011, 3:29 PM), http://www.opb.org/news/article/protesters_
invade_tribal_government/ (protesting education cuts and tribal council member severance
packages); see also ORIGINAL PECHANGA’S BLOG, http://www.originalpechanga.com/
(last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (blog of disenrolled Pechanga members protesting alleged
abuses of Pechanga tribe).
113. E.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v.
Santa Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63 (1987).
114. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 76 (opposing federal intervention into internal tribal
affairs).
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affairs. Such criticism is considered an affront to another tribe’s sovereignty
and disrespectful of its right to maintain its distinctive cultural traditions.
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT GAP IN INDIAN COUNTRY
In the Part above, I have described the doctrines of tribal sovereignty
and sovereign immunity, tribal powers of self-government, and the ways
in which tribes execute that power in the real world. I then described
how tribal government actions have become the object of a growing
number of human rights complaints. In this Part, I turn to describing
how federal Indian law, tribal law, and international law have created a
deadlock in which victims alleging human rights complaints are largely
turned away from tribal courts and left without any form of effective
recourse under tribal, federal, or international law for their injuries. In
essence, this widespread lack of access to any forum for review of these
complaints constitutes a significant gap in human rights enforcement in
Indian country.
A. Federal Law
Federal law contributes to the human rights deadlock by denying
access to federal court review for most human rights complaints that
arise in Indian country. In a Ninth Circuit case called Lewis v. Norton,
the presiding federal judge summed it up succinctly.115 He called it the
“double jurisdictional whammy” of sovereign immunity and exclusive
tribal jurisdiction over internal matters, including membership disputes.116
Essentially, individuals who allege human rights violations by tribal
governments and who present claims that establish federal question
jurisdiction are usually dismissed from federal court once the defendant
tribe raises the shield of sovereign immunity and exclusive rights to
determine internal matters.
Sovereign immunity, as I discussed in Part II, shields a tribe from suit
unless Congress or the tribe waives the immunity. For a tribal waiver to
be effective, it must be clear and unequivocal.117 Congress has only
rarely waived tribal sovereign immunity to allow anyone other than the
federal government to sue a tribe. The ICRA, which restricts tribes from

115.
116.
117.

424 F.3d at 960.
Id.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
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violating many of the individual rights represented in the Bill of Rights
and which constitutes Congress’s principal foray into recognizing the
human rights obligations of Indian tribes, does not waive tribal sovereign
immunity to allow individuals to sue in federal court to enforce the Act.118
The second part of the jurisdictional double whammy is the tribal right
to exclusive jurisdiction over internal matters of self-government. This
principle stems from Williams v. Lee, in which the Supreme Court held
that the Navajo Nation had exclusive jurisdiction over an action to recover
on a debt brought by a non-Indian storeowner against a tribal member.119
The Court held that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction, reasoning
that “[t]here can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction
here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves.”120
Of course, there are important exceptions to the jurisdictional double
whammy. Under the ICRA, habeas petitions may be reviewed by the
federal courts.121 In some cases, a plaintiff can obtain access to federal
court review for allegations that involve human rights if the individual
sues a tribal official for declaratory relief under an Ex Parte Young-type
approach.122 Significantly, however, this strategy is not available where
individuals sue to enforce the ICRA’s civil and political rights because
of the statute’s explicit limitation of federal court review to habeas relief.
In still other cases, individuals can obtain access to federal court review
for the vindication of their rights if the violation is somehow enforced by
or otherwise involves federal action. Under these circumstances, a claimant
can use the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or other applicable statute
to sue the federal government.123 Many litigants may view this avenue
as a weak proxy for suing the tribe directly as a defendant, but it can
nevertheless provide a sense of vindication and even trigger federal action
whose repercussions may motivate the tribe to modify its actions. However,
these exceptions are available in a limited minority of cases. Overall,
the jurisdictional double whammy remains a significant bar to federal
court review for human rights abuses committed by tribes.

118. Id. at 58–59.
119. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 217–18, 222–23 (1959).
120. Id. at 223.
121. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006).
122. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
123. See Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 928–29 (9th Cir. 2008);
Vann v. Salazar, No. 03-1711 (HHK), 2011 WL 4953030, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2011).
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B. Tribal Law
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the seminal case interpreting the
ICRA’s individual rights protections, the Supreme Court explained that
civil rights vindication must occur within tribal courts.124 As noted above,
federal common law also recognizes that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction
over their internal affairs including, for example, disputes over membership,
probate law, and domestic relations.
There are many powerful reasons why tribal courts should be the
frontline and principal forums for the enforcement of civil—and human
—rights violations in Indian country. Chief among them are the need to
respect the exercise of tribal sovereignty and the ability of tribes to apply
and enforce their own law and customs. Related to these is the pragmatic
recognition that tribal courts are the most effective forums for the
resolution of disputes because they are situated in proximity to the parties
and the place where the dispute is likely to have arisen. This proximity
puts the tribal court in the best position for understanding the facts of the
dispute and for ensuring accessibility for the parties and their witnesses.
Finally, tribal court resolution of disputes also avoids several costs
associated with review in federal courts. Federal courts are more likely
to bungle their resolution of tribal law questions and are less accessible
to the parties, and their decisions would constitute a significant broadening
of the reach of colonialism into Indian affairs.
Despite these factors, however, individuals with complaints involving
human rights issues are frequently denied access to tribal courts. Tribal
governments cannot be sued in tribal court unless they waive their sovereign
immunity or their immunity is waived by Congress.125 Some tribes have
implemented limited waivers under tribal law for certain categories of
claims,126 but such waivers continue to be the exception rather than the
rule. In most cases, tribes have declined to waive their immunity for these

124. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 49 (1978).
125. See supra Part II.B.
126. See, e.g., CHOCTAW TORTS CLAIM ACT § 25-1-3 (2011), available at http://
www.choctaw.org/government/tribal_code/Title%2025%20-%20Choctaw%20Torts
%20Claim%20Act.pdf; PUYALLUP TRIBAL TORT CLAIMS ACT § 4.12.010 (2002), available
at http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/puyalluptribe/html/PuyallupTribe04/Puyallup
Tribe0412.html; cf. MODEL TRIBAL TORT CLAIMS ACT FOR NON-GAMING RELATED TORTS § 4
(2008), available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/TribalUCC/MODEL%20TRIBAL%20TORT%
20CLAIMS%20ACT%20FOR%20NONGAMING%20RELATED.pdf; see also Fogleman,
supra note 47, at 1365–74.
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suits, and Congress has not exercised its prerogative.127 This failure of
tribes to open themselves to lawsuits involving fundamental individual
rights sits in stark contrast to waivers that allow suits to proceed against
the federal and state governments. Although the waivers are limited and
there continue to be important rights that lack any available remedy,
there are significantly greater opportunities to obtain judicial redress for
federal and state violations of individual rights than there are in the tribal
context.
C. International Law
Individuals who find that their cases are dismissed from tribal and
federal courts also lack access to international forums for human rights
enforcement. Although tribes, like all organs of society, are charged with
striving to secure the universal and effective recognition and observance
of human rights for all individuals, they do not shoulder enforceable
obligations under the major human rights treaties. Tribes, which do not
possess the requisite elements of statehood under international law, are
not eligible for membership in the United Nations or the Organization of
American States.128 As public entities that perform many of the same
functions as states but that nevertheless lack a claim to statehood under
international law, they are also excluded from treatment as subjects of
international treaties, including the major human rights treaties and the
protocols that implement them. 129 As a result, claims against tribal
governments cannot be brought before the international bodies that are
charged with monitoring and implementing human rights treaties.
Perhaps tribal violations of human rights should be attributed to the
United States and the United States should be held accountable under the
state responsibility doctrine of international law. Or perhaps the United
States should be held accountable in international forums for being
complicit in tribal human rights abuses. Yet another approach that might
pave the way for international accountability for tribal human rights
violations is the developing theory that nonstate entities are accountable

127. See Fogleman, supra note 47, at 1355.
128. See, e.g., Jeff Corntassel, Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking
the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse, 33 ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOC., POL.
105, 109 (2008) (discussing failed application by Six Nations of Haudenosaunee/Iroquois
to United Nations).
129. See Cowan, supra note 3, at 27; see also Kristoffer P. Kiefer, Exercising Their
Rights: Native American Nations of the United States Enhancing Political Sovereignty
Through Ratification of the Rome Statute, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 345, 357
(2005).
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for human rights obligations.130 These topics merit further exploration,
but they are beyond the scope of this Article because they either focus
on state liability rather than tribal or they involve theories that have little
proven application to Indian tribes and little hope for practical enforcement.
IV. REFORMING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
In Part II, I discussed the potential for tribal abuse of human rights. In
Part III, I described how federal law, tribal law, and international law
have created a deadlock that stymies the enforcement of human rights
claims in Indian country. In this Part, I shift from describing the human
rights enforcement problem in Indian country to arguing that tribal
sovereignty is a judicially created construct whose development has been
contingent on the history of tribal-federal relations and that our
contemporary understanding of it should include the recognition that
tribes are externally accountable for the treatment of individuals.
Within Indian country, tribal sovereignty is a publicly revered concept
that plays many roles in Indian communities. It is a bedrock principle
that marks the federal government’s recognition of native peoples’ right
to continue to govern themselves and provide for the well-being of their
communities.131 It is both a wellspring of authority and control and a shield
against external interference. It connects tribal communities to their history
and their ancestors because it represents an inherent self-governing
authority that has been passed from generation to generation, from time
immemorial to present-day tribal governments. It also connects native
people to their futures because the exercise of tribal sovereignty allows
tribes to implement their vision for the generations that follow them.
Tribal sovereignty has a social and cultural meaning for native people
that transcends its political and legal definitions. It has been described
as carrying “an aura of dignity as well as complexity,”132 with the ability
to stir powerful emotions for native people. For many, tribal sovereignty
is linked to the very lifeblood of survival for native peoples and their

130. E.g., Chris Jochnick, Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields
for the Promotion of Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 56 (1999).
131. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220–22 (1959).
132. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS
248 (2005).
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cultures. For others, tribal sovereignty has a spiritual dimension that is
characterized by a “sacred trust” of the federal government.133
Like freedom or equality, tribal sovereignty is a concept that is
invoked widely by native people and that is subject to multiple and
contested meanings. In academia and in popular culture, tribal sovereignty
has been used to refer to control over resources, cultural integrity, and
the indomitable ability of native peoples to resist centuries of colonial
actions aimed at their extermination, removal, and forced assimilation.134
Tribal sovereignty is also viewed as the basis for claims to nationhood.135
The term has gained ascendancy in the rhetoric of tribal rights on par
with sovereignty’s cousin, self-determination. With regard to selfdetermination, Vine Deloria Jr. once lamented that “[t]oday the term is
used by everyone to indicate almost every idea they want to promote,
and really has no meaning.”136 Of tribal sovereignty, Deloria similarly
commented that “the definition of sovereignty covers a multitude of sins,
having lost its political moorings, and now is adrift on the currents of
individual fancy.”137 For Deloria, native intellectuals should recall that
contemporary claims to tribal sovereignty experienced their resurgence
from the simple act of tribal members who exercised their treaty fishing
rights using the slogan, “if you act like you’re a sovereign, eventually
you will be treated as one.”138 For these individuals, tribal sovereignty is
linked to the political act of enforcing the promises made by the United
States in Indian treaties.
In this discussion, I explore the complexity of tribal sovereignty’s
meaning. I start by focusing on the pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
I then shift to recognize the indigenous perspectives on sovereignty as
well, and I recognize that the federal common law’s distillation of the
doctrine is situated within a particular historical and political context.

133. Wilma Mankiller, “Tribal Sovereignty Is a Sacred Trust”: An Open Letter to
the Conference, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 479, 479 (1998–1999).
134. E.g., Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent
Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated,
and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443; Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them
and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75 (2003); Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the
Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian
Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191 (2001); Pommersheim, supra note 1.
135. See Mike McBride III, Oklahoma’s Civil-Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over
Indian Activities in Indian Country: A Critical Commentary on Lewis v. Sac & Fox
Tribe Housing Authority, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 81, 95 (1994); Steven Paul McSloy,
American Indians and the Constitution: An Argument for Nationhood, 14 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 139 (1988–1989).
136. Vine Deloria, Jr., Intellectual Self-Determination and Sovereignty: Looking at
the Windmills in Our Minds, 13 WICAZO SA REV. 25, 26 (1998).
137. Id. at 26–27.
138. Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Furthermore, I acknowledge that the seeds of federal law’s tribal sovereignty
doctrine were sowed in European philosophical writings dating back to
the era of feudalism. In this discussion, I intend to come to grips with
each of these critiques of tribal sovereignty. My ultimate aim is to
deconstruct the doctrine of tribal sovereignty to reveal the political and
historical forces at work and to reveal how the contemporary understanding
of tribal sovereignty can and should evolve to accommodate modern
concerns about government accountability and the enforcement of
fundamental human rights.
A. The Supreme Court’s Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine
I begin with tribal sovereignty’s contemporary meaning in the context
of federal law. Within federal law, tribal sovereignty is a multilayered
concept that emerges from the amalgamation of treaties, brief references
to Indians in the U.S. Constitution, the federal common law, and acts of
Congress. No single source of law provides a definitive statement on the
meaning of tribal sovereignty. Furthermore, federal law’s interpretation
of tribal sovereignty is ultimately based on the subjective perspective of
the United States as the colonizing nation.
The constitutive documents that give shape to federal law’s treatment
of Indians are the hundreds of treaties that tribes entered into with the
earliest colonial governments and, eventually, the federal government.139
These treaties, originally serving as agreements for peace and commerce
and ultimately serving as legal tools for the cession of Indian lands,
recognized native peoples as having their own separate, distinct polities
with their own rights of self-governance over their people and territories,
capable of engaging in nation-to-nation dealings with the United States.140
In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial; with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any
other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular

139. Overall, between 1778 and 1871 the Senate ratified 372 treaties entered into
between the federal government and Indian tribes. ARLENE HIRSCHFELDER & MARTHA
K REIPE DE M ONTANO , T HE N ATIVE A MERICAN A LMANAC : A P ORTRAIT OF NATIVE
AMERICA TODAY 53 (1993).
140. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 60–63 (1999).
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region claimed . . . . The very term “nation,” so generally applied to them,
means “a people distinct from others.” The constitution, by declaring treaties
already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land,
has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and,
consequently, admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties. The words “treaty” and “nation” are words of our own
language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves,
having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are
applied to all in the same sense.141

In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Cherokee Nation sought to invoke
the Supreme Court’s Article III, Section 2 original jurisdiction over
controversies between a state and a foreign state.142 The Cherokee Nation
argued that it constituted a foreign state.143 The Supreme Court ultimately
held that the Constitution’s reference to Indian tribes as distinct from
foreign nations within the Commerce Clause indicated that the Cherokees
were not a foreign state.144 In contrast, the Court held that the Cherokee
Nation formed a “domestic dependent nation[].”145 The Court therefore
created a sui generis category to define the political status of Indians as
retaining rights of inherent self-government yet still dependent upon and
subordinate to the ultimate power of the federal government. The
language of the opinion recognizes the Cherokee Nation as “a distinct
political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own
affairs and governing itself,”146 yet also “under the sovereignty and
dominion of the United States,”147 and in a “state of pupilage” with a
relationship to the United States resembling that of a “ward to his
guardian.”148 The Court’s use of the term “domestic dependent nation”
ultimately became an entrenched part of the federal common law’s view
of Indian tribes, extending this interpretation of tribal powers to all other
native peoples within the boundaries of the United States, even those
that had never made any concessions to the federal government through
treaty negotiation or otherwise.149
141. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832).
142. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 19 (discussing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which empowers Congress
“to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes”).
145. Id. at 17.
146. Id. at 16.
147. Id. at 17.
148. Id.
149. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.,
498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); see also Joseph William Singer, Double Bind: Indian Nations
v. the Supreme Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 4–7 (2005) (explaining how Alaska
Natives lost their property rights despite never executing treaties divesting themselves of
property).
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Other decisions of the Court continued to affirm a limited view of
tribal sovereignty that was subject to the ultimate authority of the United
States. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall held that upon
discovery, the indigenous people of North America lost their full property
rights and were reduced to holding a mere possessory right with the
additional limitation that they could only alienate their interests in the
land directly to the discovering nation.150 In later opinions, the Supreme
Court also cemented federal authority over Indian people by holding that
the Indians’ “very weakness and helplessness” gave rise to a congressional
“duty of protection” and a concomitant congressional power to take
actions to satisfy that duty.151 This congressional power, coined
congressional “plenary power” in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, was interpreted
broadly to include “authority over the tribal relations of the Indians” and
“full administrative power . . . over Indian tribal property.”152 Although
theoretically constrained by the trust responsibility, this plenary power
can be used to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties153 and even terminate
the federal recognition of Indian tribes.154
Since these earliest cases on the nature of tribal sovereignty, the
Supreme Court has continued to recognize that Indian tribes possess a
unique form of sovereignty over their polities. In United States v.
Wheeler, the Supreme Court in 1978 stated its commitment to the core
principles articulated in Worcester v. Georgia.155 It stated:
The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, “inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.” Before the coming of the
Europeans, the tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities.
Like all sovereign bodies, they then had the inherent power to prescribe laws
for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.

150. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587–89 (1823).
151. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
152. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565, 568 (1903).
153. Id. at 566.
154. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335, 1341–43 (Ct. Cl.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
155. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). In Worcester v. Georgia, the
Court’s holding included that the laws of Georgia could have no force within the
Cherokee Nation. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). This portion of the opinion is not
incorporated within the federal common law because the states do exercise some forms
of limited jurisdiction within Indian country today. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006 &
Supp. 2010); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
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Indian tribes are, of course, no longer “possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty.” Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and
their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of
the sovereignty which they had previously exercised. By specific treaty
provision they yielded up other sovereign powers; by statute, in the exercise of
its plenary control, Congress has removed still others.
But our cases recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up their full
sovereignty. We have recently said: “Indian tribes are unique aggregations
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory . . . . [They] are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary
organizations.’” The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to
complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing
sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary
result of their dependent status.156

In today’s legal environment, the ground is slowly shifting toward
increased implicit diminishment of tribal sovereignty where tribes assert
jurisdiction over nonmembers. Several Supreme Court cases in the last
thirty years have used the doctrine of implicit divestiture to find that
Indian tribes have lost aspects of their sovereignty that have never been
explicitly conceded in treaties or by acts of Congress. These decisions
have primarily limited tribal sovereignty where tribes have sought to
exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians. For example, the Supreme Court
has held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians157 and
that significant limitations apply to the assertion of civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers.158

156. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322–23 (citations omitted) (quoting F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945); Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381; and United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
157. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
158. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 320
(2008) (holding that a tribal court lacked civil jurisdiction over a discrimination claim
involving the sale of fee land on the reservation brought by a tribal couple against a nonIndian bank); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364–65 (2001) (holding that a tribal court
lacked civil jurisdiction over a claim brought by a tribal member against state officers
who were enforcing a search warrant on Indian land); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438, 442 (1997) (holding that a tribal court lacked civil jurisdiction over a personal
injury action brought by non-Indians who were injured in a car accident involving a
truck operated by a non-Indian company on a right-of-way across the reservation);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (holding that tribes generally do
not have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers unless they have entered into a consensual
relationship with the nonmember or the nonmember’s conduct threatens the political
integrity, economic security, health, or welfare of the tribe).
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B. Contextualizing the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine
in History and Politics
As the discussion above illustrates, federal law provides an incomplete
statement of the scope and substance of tribal sovereignty. Our doctrinal
understanding of tribal sovereignty arises from a piecemeal process of
amalgamating diverse sources of legal authority. The end result is that
significant gaps remain, leaving lawyers and tribes with persistent
ambiguity over such fundamental issues as the limits of Congress’s
plenary power over Indian affairs, the extent of tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, and the degree to which states can exercise jurisdiction within
Indian country.159 A major reason for this incomplete iteration of tribal
sovereignty is the ad hoc approach to Indian affairs that characterizes
many of the relevant sources of law. Unlike areas of law that are defined by
statutes that attempt to provide a comprehensive treatment of a subject
area,160 the treaties, statutes, and judicial opinions that touch upon tribal
sovereignty’s substance and scope were often developed in a piecemeal
fashion, implicating the rights of individual tribes or small groups of
tribes at a time. In the case of judicial decisionmaking, the interpretation
of the content and scope of tribal sovereignty and freedom from external
control takes place within particular historic, political, and legal contexts
involving matters pertaining to individual tribes or Indians. A single
case may require the interpretation of a specific treaty and a series of
congressional enactments that apply only to that particular tribe. It may
also involve questions of tribal authority that involve a tribe with a unique
legal system or governmental institutions, or a tribe whose landholdings,
population demographics, or resources present unique factors. This deeply
contextualized process of forming Indian law challenges our ability to
draw logical conclusions about the precedential value of Indian law
decisions for other tribes and contexts. As Charles Wilkinson observed,

159. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 11 (1987).
160. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)); U.C.C. (2005).
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Federal Indian law presents uniquely formidable obstacles to the development
of consistent and unitary legal doctrine. There are a number of scattering
forces that push Indian law away from any center. Taken together, these
splintering influences have the potential of creating a body of law almost
without precedent, of reducing each dispute to the particular complex of
circumstances at issue—the tribe, its treaty or enabling statute, the races of the
parties, the tract-book location of the land where the case arose, the narrow
tribal or state power involved, and other factors.161

The ad hoc and deeply contextualized process of forming Indian law
constrains our modern understanding of tribal sovereignty. The piecemeal
approach to developing doctrine elevates the importance of the Supreme
Court as the branch of government most involved in finding and articulating
persistent norms. However, the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking is
fundamentally backward looking, looking to specific moments in history
and interpreting the law based on a narrow historical context. Our modern
understanding of tribal sovereignty, due to the fact that it is largely the
product of judicial interpretations of the law, is therefore fundamentally
retrospective and chained to the history of federal-tribal and state-tribal
relations from which Indian law cases arose.
In American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern
Constitutional Democracy, Wilkinson masterfully synthesizes the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in Indian law from the earliest years of the
nation’s history to the establishment of the self-determination era and
concludes that a major task of Indian law jurisprudence is reconciling
two historical trends within the history of federal Indian policy.162 These
two trends, one promoting a measured separatism for Indian tribes and
one promoting the opening up of Indian lands for non-Indian settlement,
provide the historical backdrop for Indian law decisionmaking. As the
historical and political context of Indian law cases, they also constrain
the horizon of federal Indian law to meanings that relate back to the
implications that flow from these two competing motives of Congress.
From the beginning of U.S. history until the mid- to late-nineteenth
century, Congress’s policy toward Indians was aimed at providing a
“measured separatism” for Indian tribes.163 The treaties and acts of
Congress relating to Indians during this time focused on setting aside
reservations for Indians where they could live without external interference,
free to continue their inherent practice of governing themselves and free
from the threat of encroachment from non-Indians and their state and
local governments.164 The “measured” nature of this separatism reflects

161.
162.
163.
164.
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the fact that the promise of separatism was not absolute; rather, it came
with federal supervision and the provision of goods and services.165 This
aid was provided to the Indians based on Congress’s assertion of itself as
a guardian to Indian peoples perceived as dependent and needing the
protection of the federal government.166
This measured separatism referred to by Wilkinson is reflected in
treaty language that commonly promised Indians the “absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation” of reservation lands and that frequently
promised Indians that “no persons except those herein so authorized . . .
shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory
described in this article.”167 The federal supervision and aid that treaties
afforded Indians is exemplified by the 1852 Treaty of Santa Fe, which
promised “donations, presents, and implements” in addition to other
“liberal and humane measures” deemed proper by the government.168
The measured separatism policy of the United States has influenced
the development of a line of cases within Indian law that views tribal
sovereignty in positive terms that recognize tribal self-governance capacities
and that protect tribes from external interference. The cases that interpret
tribal sovereignty in light of the era of Congress’s measured separatism
have held that tribes are “distinct, independent political communities”
with inherent rights of self-government that were not lost because of
their dependent status and who have the right to exist apart from nonIndians and beyond the reach of state and local laws.169 This line of cases
has also affirmed that tribes are not subject to the restrictions imposed by
the Bill of Rights because they exercise a sovereignty that is independent
and not derived from the federal government.170 Furthermore, this line of
cases recognizes that tribes are capable of resolving their own disputes
in accordance with their traditional ways and that they are not subject to
federal criminal jurisdiction absent a clear statement of Congress’s intent.171

165. Id. at 14–15.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 16 (quoting Treaty with the Kiowas and Comanches, Oct. 21, 1867, 15
Stat. 581, 582; Treaty of Fort Sumner with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat.
667, 668; and Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Sioux Indians, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat.
635, 636) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. at 15 (quoting Treaty with the Apaches, July 1, 1852, 10 Stat. 979, 980).
169. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559–62 (1832).
170. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384–85 (1896).
171. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883).
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In contrast to the measured separatism era of Indian policy, Wilkinson
describes the late nineteenth century as a period when Congress opened
up Indian reservations, imposing allotment on communally held Indian
lands, easing up statutory restrictions on alienation over time, conferring
citizenship on “competent,” civilized Indians, and selling off surplus
lands to non-Indian settlers.172 During this era of federal Indian policy,
Indian tribes were economically and culturally debilitated, leading to a
period of dormancy in their exercise of tribal sovereign powers.173
Concurrent with this silencing of Indian self-rule, Congress facilitated
the non-Indian settlement of Indian lands, creating an implied expectation
among settler society that it was subject to the uniform application of
state jurisdiction rather than any form of tribal rule or federal preemption
of state law.174
The history of opening up Indian lands to non-Indian settlement and
the implementation of policies designed to assimilate and acculturate
Indian tribes gave rise to a line of Indian law cases that failed to
acknowledge the ability of tribes to effectively govern themselves.175
This line of cases also emphasized Congress’s overriding plenary power
in Indian affairs,176 and it found space to accommodate the incursion of
limited state jurisdiction within Indian country.177
The two lines of cases described above—that interpreting the effect of
Congress’s policy of establishing a measured separatism and that
interpreting the effect of Congress’s opening up of Indian lands for nonIndian settlement—express principles of tribal sovereignty that the
Supreme Court continues to try to reconcile today. The line of cases that
deemphasizes tribal self-governance in favor of Congress’s plenary
power and accommodation of non-Indian expectations within opened
reservation areas has not fully displaced those parts of the tribal
sovereignty doctrine that affirm tribal powers and their continued right
to be free of non-Indian interference. The history of Congress’s opening
of Indian reservations was not uniform, and it produced varying results.
172. WILKINSON, supra note 159, at 19–23.
173. See id. at 19–21 (documenting federal policies that promoted assimilation and
acculturation and that generated extreme poverty within Indian communities, such as the
opening of Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) boarding schools, the breaking up of Indian
lands and traditional kinship networks caused by the allotment policy, the attempt to shift
Indians from traditional forms of subsistence to reliance on an unfeasible agrarian
lifestyle, the loss of more than a third of Indian lands due to surplus land sales and the
removal of restrictions on alienation, the displacement of traditional indigenous forms of
self-rule with local BIA control, and the influx of Christian missionaries within Indian
communities).
174. Id. at 22–23.
175. E.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886).
176. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903).
177. E.g., United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623–24 (1881).
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Thus, the salience of the second line of cases is often contingent and
context specific.
The analysis above shows that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty is
inseparably bound up with interpreting the relationship between tribes
and the federal government and the relationship between tribes and nonIndian settlers and their state and local laws. Thus, the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty is a very narrow lens for assessing the nature and scope of
tribal powers.
The discussion above also illustrates how the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty is a product of a unique set of historical forces that were
present during the era of measured separatism and the era of the opening
up of reservation lands. In a sense, the doctrine established principles in
the nineteenth century that have become frozen, or reified, through time.
As contemporary decisions in federal Indian law attempt to reconcile
divergent aspects of the tribal sovereignty doctrine, they apply concepts
that reflect nineteenth century views of tribal sovereignty. This narrow
jurisprudential approach has resulted in an impoverished and stagnant
understanding of tribal sovereignty. Two of its most glaring inadequacies
are that it fails to investigate or reflect indigenous understandings of
tribal self-rule and that it also insulates the doctrine from the influence of
changing notions of sovereignty in twentieth century international
law.178
C. The Influence of International Law on the
Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine
For purposes of this Article, I am most interested in the disconnect
between the federal law doctrine of tribal sovereignty and changes that
the doctrine of sovereignty underwent in international law in the latter
half of the twentieth century.
First, I explore the reasons for the disconnect. In the discussion above,
I explained how the doctrine of tribal sovereignty is frozen in principles
that were first articulated in Supreme Court decisions issued in the
nineteenth century. This doctrine narrowly arises from disputes that
involved either the effect of the federal government’s measured separatism
policy or the effect of the policy of opening reservations to non-Indian
settlement. In the discussion below, I focus on a second factor that
178. See Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 75, 76 (2002).
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shields tribal sovereignty’s doctrine from international law. This factor
is the impulse observed within federal Indian policy and within federal
Indian law decisions to segregate Indian law from international law
considerations.
In the Marshall trilogy, the Supreme Court wavers on the extent to
which international law can be used to explicate the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall stated that
the Court was bound to apply the international law doctrine of discovery
to a dispute over title to lands conveyed by an Indian tribe.179 In
Johnson, the discovery doctrine was borrowed from international law
and incorporated into the fabric of the U.S. legal system, resulting in
federal law’s legitimation of the stripping of full property rights from the
native peoples of North America.180 Although scholars have claimed that
Chief Justice Marshall mischaracterized the doctrine in his opinion, the
case nevertheless represents an explicit attempt to turn to international law
to interpret the rights of Indian people.181
Following Johnson, the Supreme Court shifted from using international
law paradigms to interpret the rights of Indian peoples to using a unique
approach that was grounded in the interpretation of Indian treaties, acts
of Congress, and the Constitution. This shift is observed in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, where the Supreme Court held that the Cherokee
Nation did not constitute a foreign nation capable of invoking the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit against the State of Georgia.182
Instead, Chief Justice Marshall famously described Indians as “domestic
dependent nations,” a term that was unique to the Indian tribes of the
United States because “[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the
United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.”183
One year later, in Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court returned
to using international law concepts to interpret tribal sovereignty.184 In
that case, Chief Justice Marshall considered whether the Cherokee Nation’s
acceptance of the protection of the United States effectively nullified its
claim to sovereignty. The Court considered the writings of Emerich de
Vattel, widely acknowledged as a founding father of modern international
law, who had theorized that a state could maintain its own sovereignty
even if it joined in an alliance with a more powerful nation, as long as it
179. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 316–17, 325–26 (1990).
180. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572–74 (1823).
181. DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 54 (2001).
182. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).
183. Id. at 16–17.
184. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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reserved to itself the right of governing its own body.185 The Court
ultimately adopted Vattel’s approach to understanding tribal sovereignty:
To construe the expression “managing all their affairs,” into a surrender of
self-government, would be, we think, a perversion of their necessary meaning,
and a departure from the construction which has been uniformly put on
them. . . .
....
. . . The very fact of repeated treaties with [Indian tribes] recognizes [the
Indians’ right to self-government]; and the settled doctrine of the law of
nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence—its right
to self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection.
A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the
protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a state.186

Felix S. Cohen, famed author of the Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
also argued that international law guided the early relations between the
federal government and Indian tribes. Cohen goes so far as to assert that
the language of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which protected Indian
property rights from conveyances without their consent, was a nearverbatim reiteration of Francisco de Vitoria’s writings on indigenous
property rights, as incorporated into the 1537 papal bull, Sublimis Deus.187
Cohen makes the general observation that
our Indian law originated, and can still be most clearly grasped, as a branch of
international law, and that in the field of international law the basic concepts of
modern doctrine were all hammered out by the Spanish theological jurists of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most notably by the author of the
lectures De Indis, Francisco de Vitoria.188

Despite its original reliance, the Supreme Court ultimately stopped
turning to international law to interpret the scope and content of tribal
sovereignty.189 Instead, it treated tribal sovereignty as a sui generis concept,

185. Id. at 561 (discussing Emmerich de Vattel’s theory of sovereignty); see also
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. 1, § 5 (Joseph Chitty trans., T. & J.W.
Johnson 1852) (1758).
186. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 553–54, 560–61.
187. Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United
States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (1942).
188. Id. at 17.
189. In a few cases, the Supreme Court has cited to Felix Cohen’s writings on the
Spanish legal theologian influence on aboriginal title, but references to international law
concepts have not extended beyond the issue of Indian land rights. See, e.g., United
States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 41 n.3 (1985); see also United States v. Candelaria, 271
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implying that international law concepts of sovereignty were inapplicable.
For example, in United States v. Wheeler, the Court emphasized the unique
character of tribal sovereignty, stating that “[t]he sovereignty that the
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at
the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But
until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.”190
The divorce of international law from Indian law’s tribal sovereignty
doctrine has falsely insulated the doctrine from the evolution that the
sovereignty doctrine underwent with the advent of modern international
human rights law in the twentieth century. In the discussion that follows,
I trace international law’s development from an absolute immunity view
of sovereignty to one that accommodates external accountability for
human rights violations.
D. Human Rights, International Law, and the
Evolution of Sovereignty
Until the middle of the twentieth century, international law was largely
understood as concerned only with the law between states. It was
largely accepted that international law simply did not address or relate to
individual persons.191 Louis Henkin describes international law’s
perspective on relations between a state and its subjects before the shift
toward recognizing human rights in this way: “What a State did inside
its borders in relation to its nationals remained its own affair, an element
of its autonomy, a matter of its ‘domestic jurisdiction.’”192
During this period, international law was also premised on the notion
that it pertained only to the external actions of sovereigns. Some internal
actions of sovereigns, such as the sovereign’s treatment of its citizens,
were outside the scope of international law’s concern.193 A corollary of
that presumption was that sovereigns could engage in abusive practices
against the people within their territorial limits, and those practices could
go on without any external accountability to the international community
of nation-states.

U.S. 432, 442 (1926) (referring to Spanish and Mexican legal theory to determine Indian
land rights).
190. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
191. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL
DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1989), as reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 127, 127 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS].
192. Id.
193. Id. An exception to this general rule is international law’s recognition of rights
for foreign diplomats and foreign nationals. Id.
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The gravity of the Holocaust and the unprecedented loss of life and
damage inflicted during World War II gave rise to a new interest in
using international legal institutions to protect human rights. In the
months immediately following the end of World War II in May of 1945,
the world saw two major milestones in international human rights. The
first was the signing of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter on June 26,
1945, by fifty of the fifty-one countries forming the original membership
of the U.N.194 The second major development was the signing of the
London Agreement in August of 1945.195 The discussion below begins
with a description of the London Agreement and the Nuremberg Trial
that it yielded before turning to the U.N. Charter.
The London Agreement (the Agreement) was significant because it
established an institutional mechanism for recognizing and enforcing the
human rights of the millions of victims of the Holocaust. The U.N.
Charter annexed to the Agreement identified and defined the concept of
war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.196 It
also established the protocol for the International Military Tribunal,
which then conducted the Nuremberg Trial.197 The prosecution of war
criminals who acted in accordance with the laws of their own states
represented a tremendous achievement in the evolution of international
law. The act of allowing for international judgment behind the shield of
state sovereignty is described as “pierc[ing] the State veil” of sovereignty
and as a “radical penetration of the State monolith.”198
Meanwhile, the adoption of the U.N. Charter (the Charter), the
constitutive document of the United Nations, marked another massive
stride in international human rights. The Charter itself makes several
brief references to individual rights.199 Even though the Charter makes

194. History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/aboutun/
history.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
195. Judgment at Nuremberg, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 191, at 112, 113.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL
DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19,
215 n.**, 216 (1989).
199. U.N. Charter provisions that briefly refer to human rights or that relate to them
include the second paragraph of the Preamble and Articles 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55–56, 62(2),
and 68. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3, art. 13, para. 1(b), arts. 55–56, art. 62, para. 2, art.
68, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf; see also PAUL
GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN
189 (2d ed. 2003) (“[The U.N. Charter] explicitly drew a connection between human

605

no reference to the states having any obligations correlating to those
rights, the Charter’s language is a significant milestone.200 Article 68 of
the Charter empowers the U.N. to create commissions,201 and in 1946,
pursuant to this article, it created the U.N. Human Rights Commission
(the Commission).202 The Commission was charged with submitting
reports and proposals on an international bill of rights.203
The Commission worked quickly to complete its assigned task. It
formed three successive committees that debated the content of the draft
catalog of rights.204 With each successive committee, the process became
increasingly inclusive, and a wide variety of political, cultural,
philosophical, and religious perspectives were ultimately represented.205
In December of 1948, the Commission’s draft was adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (the
Declaration).206 The Declaration recognizes the core principle that all
humans have equal human dignity, and that they share a set of basic
human rights no government is free to violate. The Declaration contains
thirty articles, and together they identify a broad spectrum of human
rights, including those relating to civil and political concerns, and those
pertaining to economic, social, and cultural concerns.207
Later, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the
Covenant), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16,
1966, the member states of the U.N. created a body responsible for
enforcing the civil and political human rights it upheld.208 That body is

well-being and international peace, reiterated support for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination, and committed the organization to promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination—‘for
all.’”).
200. From the United Nations Charter to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 191, at 137, 141–42 (citing Henkin, supra
note 198, at 215–16).
201. U.N. Charter art. 68, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/
uncharter.pdf.
202. Margaret Huang, “Going Global”: Appeals to International and Regional
Human Rights Bodies, in 2 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO
HUMAN RIGHTS 105, 107 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008).
203. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET NO. 2 (REV. 1),
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1996), available at http://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.
204. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L.
(2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/udhr/udhr_ph_e.pdf.
205. See id.
206. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III) A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
207. See id.
208. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 28, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966),
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the Human Rights Committee (the Committee).209 It is composed of
eighteen members elected as representatives of the state parties to the
Covenant.210 The Committee has two principal functions. It receives and
reviews reports from the state parties to the Covenant, and it responds to
claims by state parties that other state parties are failing to fulfill their
obligations under the Covenant.211 The reports detail the measures that
state parties have adopted to give effect to the Covenant’s recognized
rights.212 The Committee also comments on the reports and disseminates
them to the other state parties and to the Economic and Social Council of
the U.N.213
The Committee also responds to claims by one state party that another
state party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.214 The
Committee must receive notices from a minimum of ten state parties
about the claim before it can proceed.215 If this threshold is met, the
Committee gives the state party that is the subject of the claim an
opportunity to submit a response.216 If, after the passage of a set period
of time, either state remains unsatisfied, either state can initiate further
Committee action.217 The Committee can then, after ascertaining that all
domestic remedies have been exhausted, meet with the state parties to
attempt to find a solution, or if no solution is found, submit a further
report detailing the facts of the matter.218 At this point, the Committee
can form an ad hoc Conciliation Commission that can perform additional
investigation into the facts of the matter and attempt to find a solution to
the claim.219 The Conciliation Commission must then submit its own
report on any solution that was found, with further information about the
facts of the matter.220

available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/volume999/v999.pdf [hereinafter
ICCPR].
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. arts. 40–41.
212. Id. art. 40.
213. Id.
214. Id. art. 41.
215. Id. art. 41(2).
216. Id. art. 41(1)(a).
217. Id. art. 41(1)(b).
218. Id. art. 41(1)(h).
219. Id. art. 42.
220. Id. art. 42(7).
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The enforcement mechanism of the Covenant is also supplemented by
its Optional Protocol. The Optional Protocol allows the Human Rights
Committee to receive complaints filed by individuals as well.221
In summary, the Declaration and the Covenant represent watershed
moments in the development of human rights law and international law
more broadly. They signify the movement away from the notion that
sovereignty is an inviolable shield and toward an understanding that
state governments are externally accountable for the domestic treatment
of their own subjects.
Because of Indian law’s isolation from international law in the
twentieth century, the dramatic changes that sovereignty underwent were
never translated to the Indian law context. As a result, tribal sovereignty
has remained caught in a time warp, frozen in the form it took when the
Supreme Court began to articulate the tribal sovereignty doctrine in the
nineteenth century. The piecemeal, nonexhaustive case law that has given
tribal sovereignty its current shape has primarily functioned to interpret
the relationship between the Indian tribes and the federal government or
between tribes and non-Indians. As a result, it has never had occasion to
engage with the impact of human rights on tribal sovereignty’s meaning.
Given this omission, might Indian tribes maintain that their sovereignty
is immune from human rights accountability and therefore unlike any
other in the world? Such a position is untenable under international human
rights law. Given the external accountability that tribes must acknowledge
for human rights enforcement, and given the widespread unavailability
of tribal, federal, and international forums for human rights complaints
arising in Indian country, the time is ripe for a plan of action that will
establish an intertribal human rights regime in Indian country.
E. The Harms Produced by Lack of Human Rights Accountability
The need for an intertribal regime is also underscored when one
considers the harms that lack of accountability creates for Indian tribes
and their polities. Perhaps the most grievous harm is the impact that
lack of accountability has on victims. Without access to a forum for
their claims, victims are unable to obtain a remedy for the harms that
they suffer, and they never receive vindication of their rights. This lack
of access to relief is a denial of their basic claim to dignity and
compassion, and it runs counter to the goals of healing, reconciliation,
restoration of harmony, and repair of relationships that are often

221. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3bf0.html.
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described as central aspects of tribal justice.222 Lack of human rights
enforcement also deprives victims of other remedies that are generally
considered appropriate and helpful for victims, including financial
compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction in verifying the
truth or receiving an apology, revelation of the truth, and an assurance
that the harm will not be repeated.223 Furthermore, when governments
are not accountable for human rights violations, victims have a heightened
vulnerability to retaliation once they speak openly about their experience.224
It is often the victims of abuse who are most at risk of suffering new
forms of abusive treatment because they pose the greatest threat of
revealing the abuser’s oppressive practices. Legal regimes that allow
government actors to avoid responsibility for human rights abuses pose
grave dangers for victims.
Lack of accountability for human rights abuses is also damaging
because it eliminates a powerful incentive for government reform. If
tribal governments are forced to come to terms with abusive practices,
they may be more likely to remove individual perpetrators from office
and reform government institutions, policies, and laws to reduce the
chance of repetition.225 Without an effective check on human rights abuses,
tribal governments will suffer because the conditions that created the
opportunity for abuse will persist. Even worse, freedom from accountability
can lead to a culture of impunity that may breed more human rights
violations in the community.226

222. See Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh
Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 77 (2008); Emily Mansfield, Balance and
Harmony: Peacemaking in the Coast Salish Tribes of the Pacific Northwest, 10
MEDIATION Q. 339, 344 (1993); Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and
Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126, 127–28 (1995); Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”:
Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 184–85 (1994).
223. See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights
Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 360–64 (2008) (describing the Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005).
224. Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶¶ 137–207 (Mar. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter Situation of Human Rights Defenders Report].
225. Matthew Draper, Justice as a Building Block of Democracy in Transitional
Societies: The Case of Indonesia, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 402 (2002).
226. Situation of Human Rights Defenders Report, supra note 224, at 31.
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Finally, lack of accountability for human rights abuses harms tribes
because it increases the risk of a backlash against tribal sovereignty.
Disenrollments in California have spawned the creation of several
grassroots organizations that disseminate information to the public about
their human rights complaints.227 In California, an activist opposing
tribal disenrollments drafted legislation called the California Indian
Legacy Act that purported to force all California tribes to accept as
members anyone certified by the BIA to be a descendant of the band.228
Under this proposal, the remedy for noncompliance is loss of federal
recognition.229 In 2009, in the case of the Cherokee Freedmen, a bill
was introduced into Congress that purported to terminate the Cherokee
Nation until it restored full tribal citizenship to them.230 Judges have
also publicly denounced the ability of tribes to avoid judicial review in
cases involving individual rights. In a case involving a challenge to the
Table Mountain Rancheria’s refusal to grant several lineal descendants
membership in the tribe, U.S. District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton
exclaimed that “somebody ought to warn the tribe that this is the kind of
facts where some court is going to say ‘we’re outraged’ and put it to
them.”231 When the Ninth Circuit also dismissed the suit for lack of
federal jurisdiction over membership issues and the tribe’s sovereign
immunity, the court agreed with the district court that the case was
“deeply troubling on the level of fundamental substantive justice.”232
These instances demonstrate that the stakes are high. Even when tribes
appear to be fully protected by long-standing principles of federal Indian
law, the risk remains that in cases where tribes appear to abuse their

227. See, e.g., Emily Bazar, Native American? The Tribe Says No, USA TODAY,
Nov. 29, 2006, at 1A, available at 2006 WLNR 20606163 (discussing disenrollment
advocacy work of the Many Lightnings American Indian Legacy Center); Stephen
Magagnini, Indians Barred from Tribes Seek Help, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 15, 2004, at
A3, available at 2004 WLNR 20787196 (describing grassroots efforts of California
Indians For Justice); About AIRRO, AM. INDIAN RTS. & RESOURCES ORG. (2008),
http://www.airro.org/about.html.
228. Elizabeth Larson, Efforts Increase To Draw Attention to Indian Disenrollment
Problem, LAKE COUNTY NEWS (May 9, 2010, 6:25 PM), http://www.lakeconews.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13862:efforts-increase-to-draw-attent
ion-to-indian-disenrollment-problem-&catid=1:latest&Itemid=197.
229. See California Indian Legacy Act, PETITION SITE, http://www.thepetitionsite.com/
takeaction/691/320/030/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
230. See H.R. 2824, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (“A bill [t]o sever United States’
government relations with the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma until such time as the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma restores full tribal citizenship to the Cherokee Freedmen
disenfranchised in the March 3, 2007, Cherokee Nation vote and fulfills all its treaty
obligations with the Government of the United States, and for other purposes.”).
231. Jerry Bier, Nowhere To Turn, FRESNO BEE, Aug. 22, 2004, at A1, available at
2004 WLNR 17586108.
232. Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2005).
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power, Congress or the Supreme Court may respond by expanding federal
court review of ICRA actions or by limiting sovereign immunity.
Public outcry over human rights abuses also threatens to diminish
relationships between tribes and their surrounding communities.
Interdependence between tribes and the non-Indian world is a critical
facet of everyday life within Indian country. Tribal intergovernmental
relationships with local units of government and state and federal agencies
are essential for a wide array of government services, from effective law
enforcement to the provision of human services to the management of
natural resources in Indian country. Furthermore, tribal economic interests
depend upon maintaining healthy relationships in commercial dealings.
Each of these relationships has the potential to suffer if a tribe gains
notoriety for human rights abuses.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERTRIBAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
A. The Proposal
An intertribal human rights regime offers the best possible method of
providing external accountability for tribal abuses of human rights. This
approach has several advantages. It allows tribes to collectively respond
to the need for greater external accountability on their own terms, and it
allows human rights violations to be addressed without resorting to the
diminishment of tribes’ sovereign powers by the federal government.
The development and application of substantive human rights norms
by tribes also offers several benefits. It allows tribes to articulate and
interpret universal human rights in light of their cultural, philosophical,
spiritual, political, and social perspectives. Such a regime would also
provide an institutional forum to allow tribes to discuss and respond to
the actions of tribal governments who are accused of human rights
violations. Furthermore, such a regime would also act as a central
resource that could assist individual tribal governments with the task of
adapting their domestic legal systems to ensure that human rights norms
are internalized, promoted, and protected.
The treaty-making process will require three initial planning phases.
The first step will be gaining broad support within Indian country for the
task of forming the treaty. The support must include a broad array of
individuals representing tribal elected leadership, individuals who work
in tribal government, persons with independent organizations in Indian
country, and those with grassroots connections within Indian communities.
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These individuals are needed to spread information about human rights
enforcement in Indian country and mobilize Indian communities.
The second major step will be reaching an agreement on universal
norms to be included in the treaty. The debate between universality and
cultural pluralism is sure to be ignited as the normative content of the
treaty is considered. At the same time, however, tribes will benefit from
drawing upon the strategies that have been used in other international
contexts for reconciling recognition of universal human rights with
respect for cultural diversity, self-determination, custom, and tradition.
The third major step will be agreeing upon an institutional framework
for enforcement. The framework will need to not only respect tribal
sovereignty and self-determination but also ensure that human rights
abuses are reviewed and addressed in a meaningful way. Here, tribes will
also benefit from the examples set by the human rights instruments and
institutions established by the United Nations and other regional systems.
Tribal participation in this effort has the potential to transform traditional
notions of tribal sovereignty and self-governance. The making of an
intertribal treaty on human rights will revitalize the latent power of tribes
to govern for their collective welfare. If successful, a human rights treaty
may open the door to additional treaties on other subjects where collective
action is needed. Furthermore, the practice of intertribal diplomacy will
also connect to a rich indigenous tradition that, if revitalized, may provide
lessons on nation building and effective governance for all sovereigns.
B. Areas of Special Concern
The project to develop an intertribal human rights regime requires
broad-based support within Indian country. In other contexts, such as
the small islands in the Pacific, the effort to develop a regional human
rights convention faltered because the project lacked widespread buy-in
and was viewed as an effort imposed by outsiders. Within Indian country,
this danger is especially acute because there is widespread disdain for
the top-down imposition of policies on native communities. Past efforts
to do so, such as the passage of the ICRA, represented misguided colonial
efforts to regulate tribal governments. In the case of human rights, it is
essential that native people take ownership over the entire process of
developing an intertribal regime, from the initial planning stages, to the
selection of norms to be recognized, to the drafting and design of the
system of implementation for the agreement. The task of amassing such
inclusive support will be difficult and will require direct and initial
engagement with the concerns of skeptics. In the discussion that follows,
I describe, grapple with, and respond to three concerns that must be
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addressed at the outset to ensure that the human rights project earns
public support.
1. Colonialism
First, many skeptics will question whether a human rights regime
within Indian country would serve to assimilate native communities and
weaken their cultural and political diversity. The argument is that the
human rights articulated in international instruments, such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reflect European, Western values
and norms, and that a human rights treaty between Indian tribes will
incorporate these Western norms and be used as a standard against
which Indian tribes will be judged, penalizing them for their cultural
distinctiveness and awarding them for moving toward greater homogeneity
and a closer resemblance to Western liberal democracies.
I have two primary responses to these arguments. The first rebuts the
contention that human rights, as represented by international instruments
within international law, are fundamentally Western, and the second
responds to the claim that recognizing human rights will be harmful for
tribal rights to cultural distinctiveness and pluralism.
First, historical studies of the development of human rights norms in
international law reveal that the process of drafting the Declaration in
1948 was broadly inclusive. As discussed previously, when the U.N.
Human Rights Commission was established pursuant to the U.N. Charter
in 1946, the Commission formed three successive committees that
debated the content of the draft catalog of rights. With each successive
committee, the process became increasingly open, and a wide variety of
political, cultural, philosophical, and religious perspectives from around
the world were ultimately represented, with significant contributions
from non-Western states.233 The human rights norms that made the final
version of the Declaration were the product of an intense period of
negotiation and compromise, and they each reflect a commitment to a
single common purpose that resonates across cultural boundaries, namely,
that all humans are entitled to equal human dignity.
In addition, human rights are capable of articulation, recognition, and
enforcement in unique regional conventions that respond to the specific
233. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 133
(Henry J. Steiner et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008); GRACE Y. KAO, GROUNDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
A PLURALIST WORLD 22–24 (2011).
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needs of sovereigns with proximity to each other. The claim to universality
of some instruments and conventions does not obviate the need for more
local communities to reflect on the best means of articulating and
enforcing human rights within specific cultural and geographic contexts.
Regional human rights conventions have been successfully developed
and enforced in Africa, the Americas, and Europe, and many other regional
groups around the world are working to develop similar approaches to
human rights recognition and enforcement.
Regional human rights conventions have been used to protect cultural
diversity, promote traditional practices and values, and empower groups
that are working to dismantle the effects of colonialism. The African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter) is a powerful
example of how a regional human rights convention can protect human
rights by responding to the unique concerns of culturally distinctive
sovereigns who refuse to blindly adhere to norms associated with European
institutions. When the drafting of the African Charter began, the President
of Senegal exhorted the drafters to recall that
Europe and America have constructed their system of rights and liberties with
reference to a common civilization, to respective peoples and to some specific
aspirations. It is not for us Africans either to copy them or to seek originality
for originality’s sake. It is for us to manifest both imagination and skill.
Those of our traditions that are beautiful and positive may inspire us. You
should therefore constantly keep in mind our values and the real needs of
Africa.234

The African Charter responds to this call for deliberate distinctiveness
in a variety of ways. For example, paragraph 5 of the preamble of the
African Charter states that “their reflection on the concept of human and
peoples’ rights” is deeply connected to “consideration [of] the virtues of
their historical tradition and values of African civilization.”235
The African Charter also reflects the unique cultural standpoint of its
signatories by the inclusion of unique provisions that focus on the value
of family. Article 17(3) of the African Charter states, “The promotion
and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the
community shall be the duty of the State.”236 The African Charter also
balances its enumeration of rights with an emphasis on responsibility,
recognizes the relationship between the well-being of individuals and the

234. President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, Remarks at the Conference on
Drafting the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as quoted in Olusola Ojo,
Understanding Human Rights in Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD:
INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 115, 116 (Jan Berting et al. eds., 1990).
235. U. OJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
app. at 145 (1997).
236. Id. app. at 149.
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well-being of their communities, and replaces the terminology of
“individual rights” in favor of “peoples’ rights.” In addition, the African
Charter recognizes the influence of colonization and the need to support
a shift away from economic dependence.237
The governments of the Pacific Islands have also struggled to develop
a regional human rights regime, and their work provides lessons for the
tribal context in the United States. One commentator has described the
benefits of a Pacific Islands human rights regime as including the
opportunity to expand upon the universal rights established by international
human rights instruments to include recognition of unique rights and
duties that are relevant to the Pacific Island countries and territories.238
These unique rights include traditional fishing rights, the “right to a safe
or quality environment or land to live on,” and environmental rights that
are uniquely responsive to the impacts of climate change.239
The African and Pacific Island examples indicate that a tribal human
rights project need not signify cultural imperialism within Indian country.
By taking ownership of the process of developing the convention, native
people can create a regime that respects human rights from a uniquely
indigenous perspective. For example, a tribal human rights convention
could reflect on the impact of colonization on tribal peoples and
governments, and it could recognize unique human rights that reflect
shared values across native cultures. Human rights in Indian country
could, for example, be expanded to reflect rights to land, environmental
quality, freedom of religion and rights to sacred sites, treaty rights, and
cultural rights that are specific to the concerns and values of native peoples
within the United States. To the extent tribes articulate their distinctive
interpretation of human rights, they could also become a valuable source
of inspiration and enlightenment that contributes to global human rights
discourses.
Some persons may question whether the interweaving of an indigenous
perspective into a tribal human rights convention might still threaten
native cultural distinctiveness because it would adopt a constructed panIndian worldview rather than respect the diversity of Indian country.
However, there are two factors that suggest that this need not be the case.
237. Id. app. at 151 (committing African states to eliminating “all forms of foreign
[economic] exploitation particularly that practised by international monopolies”).
238. P. Imrana Jalal, Why Do We Need a Pacific Regional Human Rights Commission?,
40 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 177, 183–84 (2009).
239. Id. at 184.
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First, we must recognize that Indian country is fundamentally diverse,
as reflected by the vast number of Indian tribes in the United States, the
multiple and varying landscapes that make up their homelands, and the
unique languages and cultural teachings that they possess. However, in
addition to this diversity, many also recognize that there are values and
experiences that are shared among many native peoples within North
America. In a recent column, two scholars responded to what they consider
an alarming fragmentation and growth of debilitating controversies within
Indian country by calling for native people to build stronger governments
using fundamental shared values:
Each Native nation, of course, acts under its own set of “core” values, but we
are convinced that indigenous peoples throughout the Americas and across the
world share certain intellectual and emotional understandings that once held
them in good stead and that might again serve as the basis on which to
construct stronger Native societies and governments.240

The authors suggested that the four values of personal sovereignty or
autonomy, interdependency, sacred character, and maturity could serve
as a starting point for calling upon native people across the country to
share in a concerted effort to strengthen their governments.241 The project
to develop a human rights regime in Indian country could also begin by
identifying shared core values that also respect and acknowledge diversity.
In response to the concern that a pan-Indian approach to human rights
might stifle diversity, a second factor to consider is that human rights
conventions are capable of being interpreted locally. One scholar has
coined the term legal vernacularization to describe how local, indigenous
cultures can assign meaning to universal norms with reference to their
unique histories and perspectives.242 She writes:
[I]n the post-colonial world, [human rights are] no longer owned by the West.
As indigenous groups seek to define a space for themselves in the modern
world, they seize and redefine law as the basis for their claims to justice. The
law they mobilize is not simply the law of the state or the United Nations but
an appropriated notion of law that joins indigenous concepts with state and
global law. Thus, although they talk [about] rights, reparations, and claims—
the language of law—they construct a new law out of the pieces of the old. . . .
[The colonial law] is becoming a vernacular law rather than transnational
imperial law.243

240. David E. Wilkins & Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, Refocusing Our Values,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 10, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
ict_sbc/refocusing-our-values.
241. Id.
242. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Vernacularization and Ka Ho’okolokolonui Kanaka
Maoli, the People’s International Tribunal, Hawai’i 1993, 19 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY
REV. 67, 67–68 (1996).
243. Id. at 68.
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In this case, the Ka Ho’okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli (the People’s
International Tribunal) staged a trial of the United States for the takeover
of the sovereign nation of Hawaii. During the trial and in its written
opinion, the tribunal appropriated federal and international law and
vernacularized it with local meanings and indigenous interpretations.
Similarly, the application and interpretation of a tribal human rights
convention can also be mediated by this process of local vernacularization,
where “the global becomes localized, no longer simply a global imposition
but something which is infused with the meanings, signs, and practices
of local places.”244
In the case of a tribal human rights convention, the process of local
interpretation of the human rights norms could be enriched by drawing
upon the cultural values, creation stories, and wisdom of individual tribes.
For example, interpretation of human rights norms in Anishnaabe culture
could draw upon the concept of bimaadiziwin (living the Anishnaabe
life; the good life) and the Seven Grandfather Teachings, which identify
nbwaakaawin (wisdom), zaagidewin (love), mnaadendiwin (respect), aakde
‘win (bravery), gwekwaadsiwin (honesty), ddadendizwin (humility), and
debwewin (truth) as principles that should guide all of our interactions
with one another.245 By interpreting human rights norms in light of
traditional teachings, the human rights convention protects and gives life
to cherished cultural values and also engages traditional values in a
cross-cultural educational process that may be generative for other
native communities as they develop their own interpretative strategies.
2. Sovereignty
A second argument that I anticipate being made against a tribal human
rights project is that the regime would encroach on tribal sovereignty.
I have several responses to this claim.
First, as I discussed earlier, the conventional understanding of tribal
sovereignty improperly fails to recognize that tribes, like all sovereigns,
are externally accountable for violations of human rights. As I
demonstrated earlier, the tribal sovereignty doctrine evolved from a
particular historical and political context in which the primary focus of
244. Id. at 80.
245. Vanessa A. Watts, Towards Anishnaabe Governance and Accountability:
Reawakening Our Relationships and Sacred Bimaadiziwin 3, 17–18 (2006) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Victoria) (on file with the University of Victoria).
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the Supreme Court was in determining the legal boundaries of tribal,
federal, and state authority over tribes and their territories in light of the
aims of creating a measured separatism or of opening up reservations for
non-Indian settlement. The principles of tribal sovereignty articulated in
federal law date back to an era when sovereigns were still understood as
having absolute dominion over their territories and subjects. Federal
Indian law is unique in that it adds the overlay of congressional plenary
power over the doctrine of sovereignty in Indian law, but the notion that
tribes would have absolute authority over their internal affairs is
nevertheless evident in treaties and the opinions of the Supreme Court.
Today, this understanding of sovereignty is anachronistic and an affront
to human rights. Consider, for example, the fact that Chief Justice Marshall
was inspired by Vattel in his articulation of tribal sovereign powers
when he drafted the Marshall trilogy.246 Vattel’s recognition of the
absolute internal dominion of sovereigns was relied upon in the opinion
for Dred Scott v. Sandford, one of the worst deprivations of human
rights ever countenanced by the Supreme Court.247 The time is certainly
246. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832); Johnson v. M’Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 568–69 (1823). In Worcester, the Court stated the following:
“Tributary and feudatory states,” says Vattel, “do not thereby cease to be
sovereign and independent states, so long as self government, and sovereign
and independent authority, are left in the administration of the state.” At the
present day, more than one state may be considered as holding its right of self
government under the guarantee and protection of one or more allies.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties,
and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United
States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560.
247. Dred Scott v. Sandford quoted Vattel for the following statement on the
absolute freedom of a sovereign from external judgment:
So, in section 20: “A nation, then, is mistress of her own actions, so long as
they do not affect the proper and perfect rights of any other nation—so long as
she is only internally bound, and does not lie under any external and perfect
obligation. If she makes an ill use of her liberty, she is guilty of a breach of
duty; but other nations are bound to acquiesce in her conduct, since they have
no right to dictate to her. Since nations are free, independent, and equal, and
since each possesses the right of judging, according to the dictates of her
conscience, what conduct she is to pursue, in order to fulfill her duties, the
effect of the whole is to produce, at least externally, in the eyes of mankind, a
perfect equality of rights between nations, in the administration of their affairs,
and in the pursuit of their pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of
their conduct, of which others have no right to form a definitive judgment.”
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 484 (1857) (Daniel, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
VATTEL, supra note 185, at bk. 1, § 20), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
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ripe for Indian tribes to relinquish their flawed claims to absolute internal
sovereignty with the sole exceptions of congressional plenary power and
judicial implicit diminishment and to recognize that all sovereigns must
be externally accountable for human rights.
Some skeptics may counter that if tribes recognize external accountability
for human rights, they will open the door to increased federal interference
with tribal affairs. However, I believe that this fear would be misplaced.
Tribal sovereignty’s accommodation of external accountability for human
rights would not necessarily open tribes to increased federal control.
Tribes would still be able to use their sovereign immunity to avoid being
sued in tribal or federal courts, and the federal courts would still be
required to dismiss suits where a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction.
Furthermore, Congress already claims to have plenary power to encroach
on tribal sovereignty, so the recognition that tribes are externally
accountable for human rights would not result in an expansion of
Congress’s authority in Indian affairs.
I also argue that the creation of an intertribal human rights regime
would expand sovereignty for Indian tribes. The treaty would extend tribal
sovereignty beyond traditional territorial and membership limits into the
realm of intertribal lawmaking. Intertribal treaty making also expands
the universe of tribal lawmaking’s traditional subject matters because it
allows tribes to address matters that affect their collective welfare.
Others may question whether tribes should refrain from judging the
actions of others because such scrutiny is disrespectful of another tribe’s
sovereignty and right to cultural and political distinctiveness. Some
leaders within Indian country may also wonder whether finger-pointing
will produce more harm than good for the causes of native peoples.
A human rights regime is likely to increase Indian and non-Indian attention
on the wrongful actions of some tribal governments, and this may cause
tribes to lose influence in Congress or damage relationships with allies
in economic, political, and social dealings.
My response to these concerns is that tribal isolationism is harmful for
many practical reasons, and it also conflicts with some of the core shared
values that are commonly attributed to tribes. By tribal isolationism,
I refer to the reluctance of tribal leadership to criticize or openly discuss
reports of abuses of power that emanate from other tribal communities.
In two high-profile matters that involve allegations of human rights
abuses—the disenrollment of large numbers of tribal members in California
and elsewhere, and the expulsion of the Cherokee Freedmen from the
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Cherokee Nation—the silence of tribal leadership from other native
nations is uniform and remarkable.248 One scholar has commented that
isolationism is rampant in Indian country and that its primary cause is
500 years of abuse through colonization.249 According to this view, the
cumulative effect of colonialism’s impact across multiple generations of
native peoples is the creation of “a politics of resignation, reactiveness,
and continuing dependence on outsiders for leadership.”250 In contrast,
global action “is an act of faith and self-confidence” that affirms that
Indians “have a substantive contribution to make to the liberation and
development of other indigenous peoples.”251
Political isolationism among Indian tribes is harmful because it deprives
tribal governments engaged in abusive practices from benefiting from
the wisdom, experience, and successes of other tribes. The silence
surrounding the abusive actions of some tribal governments, even if
they are outliers marginalized from other native nations in the United
States, can be interpreted by others as implied consent. Finally, isolationism
prevents human rights abusers from accessing the concrete resources
they need to reform their laws, institutions, and practices. These resources,
implemented through sheer innovation and commitment by some tribes,
should be shared, discussed, and distributed as best practices, allowing
all tribes to benefit from their development.252
Isolationism in Indian country also runs contrary to tribal tradition and
historic practices. Many would agree that one of the core shared values
of indigenous peoples in the United States is a relational understanding
of rights and obligations founded on universal kinship. This relational
understanding transcends familial relationships, extending to political
and social relationships and relationships with the natural world. In
diplomatic relations between traditional native nations in North America,
each nation within a confederation assumed a kinship relation to
others.253 Thus, nations would be thought of as brothers, with rights and
responsibilities for mutual welfare that one would associate with a brother-

248. But see George Wickliffe, UKB Chief: Cherokee Nation Can’t Break Treaty,
INDIANZ.COM (June 20, 2007), http://64.38.12.138/News/2007/003511.asp (providing
opinion of the Chief of the Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma regarding
the Cherokee Nation’s expulsion of the Cherokee Freedmen).
249. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 285 (1993).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 286, 292.
252. See, e.g., Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission Plan of Operation,
NAVAJO NATION, http://www.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/pdfs/PlanofOperation.pdf (last visited
Sept. 27, 2012).
253. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY
VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600–1800, at 62–66, 71 (1997).
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brother relationship.254 In such a relationship, coercion would be publicly
disdained and considered a sign of weakness, but public opinion, ridicule,
and censure were vital forces that motivated people toward honorable
conduct.255 Rather than turn a blind eye toward the transgressions of
other tribes, a tribal human rights regime would allow tribes to revitalize
their traditional diplomatic relationships with each other to promote the
collective welfare of all human rights victims.
3. Consensus Building
A third concern that I anticipate is that the human rights treaty process
will fail to launch because there will be little incentive for widespread
agreement and participation. Tribes are independent sovereigns, each
with its own vision of self-determination and each with its own
constituencies demanding commitment to local priorities. Furthermore,
some would argue that tribal governments are self-interested, and the human
rights treaty-making process will offer little incentive for participation.
Although it is true that collective action in Indian country is extremely
difficult to achieve, it is not impossible. Organizations that facilitate
collective action, such as the National Congress of American Indians,
exist, and their resources and expertise could be recruited to the cause of
human rights in Indian country. Furthermore, the project of developing
an intertribal human rights treaty will not necessarily fail for lack of
widespread participation. The human rights treaty could begin with a
core group of signatories, and additional participants could sign on to it
once they recognize its benefits. Other conventions in international law
have had similar histories, where the number of signatories expanded as
additional states acceded over time.256
Furthermore, international law scholars have developed theories that
attempt to explain why states behave in accordance with international
law. This scholarship identifies several factors that are applicable to the
254. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Nature and Spirit of North American Political
Systems, 10 AM. INDIAN Q. 181, 194 (1986).
255. Id. at 184 (citing G. COPWAY, THE TRADITIONAL HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTIC
SKETCHES OF THE OJIBWAY NATION 141 (1850); RALPH LINTON, THE STUDY OF MAN: AN
INTRODUCTION 224 (1936); ROBERT H. LOWIE, PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 385 (1920); and PAUL
RADIN, PRIMITIVE MAN AS PHILOSOPHER 51 (1927)).
256. For example, the signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty grew
from sixty-eight in July 1968 to 189 by July 2011. Status of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF.,
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
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collective action problem in this case as well. Harold Koh’s scholarship
examines the field of contributions in this area and offers a typology that
names and describes each approach.257 He explains that there is a spectrum
of theories with varying degrees of explanatory power of why states
obey international law, ranging from sheer force of coercion to the complete
legal internalization of international law norms.258
The first incentive, sheer power, is evident when nations obey
international law because someone else made them do it.259 A second
reason why nations obey international law is because they are acting
within their self-interest.260 Under this theory, nations agree to consent
to international law regimes because they make a calculated determination
that participation and its associated costs will be outweighed by the
benefits to be garnered by becoming a signatory.261
A third approach to understanding why nations obey international law
is described by Koh as the “liberal theory” approach.262 Koh sees two
strands here: the first explaining international law compliance as a
function of state perception that a rule is legitimate, and the second
explaining compliance as a function of a state’s perception of its identity
as a liberal democracy.263
A fourth approach, a communitarian theory, supposes that nations
obey international law because they are drawn to the values of the
community of which they are a part.264 The fifth theory, termed
“transnational legal process,” explains that nations obey international
law through a process in which nations collectively form international
law regimes through horizontal action, and then the rules gradually work
their way toward becoming internalized within a nation’s domestic legal
system.265
Koh’s typology has some use for explaining how we can encourage
Indian tribes to participate in the human rights project, and it also
advances our understanding of how a human rights regime may eventually
filter down into domestic tribal legal systems and result in greater
compliance with human rights norms. The most salient theories that
apply to the human rights project at this stage are the self-interest paradigm,
the communitarian theory, and the transnational legal process theory.
257. See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?,
74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999).
258. Id. at 1401–03, 1405–06, 1411.
259. Id. at 1401–02.
260. Id. at 1402.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1403–04.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1405.
265. Id. at 1401, 1406.
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First, the tribes may be motivated to incur the costs of participating in
the deliberation, drafting, and enforcement of an intertribal regime if
they can identify long-term rewards that outweigh their costs. Thus, it is
critical that information about the long-term rewards of participation be
disseminated throughout Indian country. Such rewards include knowing
that the tribe’s actions will aid victims, knowing that the tribe will be
able to assist with government reform to eradicate human rights abuses,
earning a reputation as a promoter of human rights and social justice,
and earning a reputation as a sovereign committed to the rule of law.
Each of these reputational rewards is likely to produce other indirect
rewards, such as improved relations with tribal members and non-Indian
residents and employees, improved relations with neighboring non-Indian
communities, improved relations with partners in commercial dealings,
and improved relations with federal, state, and local governments.
The communitarian theory also has salience for tribes and the human
rights project. Tribes are likely to be drawn to participate in the human
rights project if they identify with other participants and want to publicly
reflect that they share the same values. In Indian country, shared group
identity is a powerful bond between native nations. To maximize the
impact of this dynamic, information about the tribes that choose to join
in the human rights project should be widely disseminated, with the hope
that other tribes will identify with them and choose to join to reflect their
allegiance and shared values.
Finally, the transnational legal process theory is illuminating and can
certainly be used to inform strategies for the intertribal human rights
project. Professor Koh, in describing this process, identifies several sets
of actors and processes that contribute to state compliance with
international law.266 The success of the intertribal human rights project
will be enhanced if these actors and processes are intentionally harnessed to
promote participation in the treaty and enforcement of its terms, both
domestically and in the intertribal institutional context. Koh identifies
essential agents in the process that he terms “transnational norm
entrepreneurs.”267 These are individuals and organizations who generate
interest and support for their cause both within their nation and
internationally.268 They create networks of information sharing about

266.
267.
268.

Id. at 1409–10.
Id. at 1409.
Id.
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their cause, termed “transnational issue networks” by Koh.269 These
networks include forums where the norm entrepreneurs confer, deliberate,
and publicly discuss and identify solutions for their cause, all with the
participation of contacts in domestic and international governments,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and any other
interested groups that can be drawn into the fray.270 The norm
entrepreneurs then identify “government norm sponsors” who use their
office to promote specific policies and solutions.271 Lastly, the norm
entrepreneurs also identify opportunities for “specific interpretation” of
the norms, with success enhanced if multiple forums can be employed
using international institutions, courts at all levels of government,
legislatures, NGOs, and any other entity, organization, or office that can
be used to further the successful interpretation of the norm.272 Finally,
Koh predicts that if each of these agents and processes work, then the
norms that originated at the international level can successfully be
internalized domestically.273 To ensure that this last step occurs, government
leadership and in-house attorneys play a critical role in mandating
government reform and in drafting the laws, regulations, or policies that
will implement the reform.
The intertribal human rights regime will have a greater chance at
success if each of the agents and processes can be used to maximum
benefit. First, the project will need intertribal norm entrepreneurs who
will be willing to take up the human rights cause and mobilize support
both within specific tribal communities and on a national level. These
entrepreneurs could come from diverse corners of Indian country, but
they will be most effective if they already have existing networks from
their membership in existing institutions or organizations in Indian
country. Second, the norm entrepreneurs will need to create “intertribal
issue networks” to create forums for the exchange of information, ideas,
and solutions. This process could be facilitated through the planning of
conferences, working groups, special action committees, and organizations
dedicated to finding new avenues for educational exchange. The activists
on this issue will also need to locate “government norm sponsors,” or
elected tribal leaders and government employees who will use their
positions to promote the drafting of the treaty and participation of other
tribes. Finally, the treaty will need to be applied and interpreted, both

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
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using the institutional enforcement mechanism established by the treaty
and using domestic legal processes within each tribe’s legal system.
Ultimately, Koh’s transnational legal process theory illustrates how
tribal participation in the intertribal human rights project may ultimately
result in internalization of the norms and domestic compliance. This
lesson is powerful because it recognizes that domestic legal systems are
on the frontlines of human rights enforcement and an intertribal regime
must always focus on how its actions will influence compliance at this
most basic, localized level.
VI. CONCLUSION
Indian tribes have been subject to heightened scrutiny by Congress,
the courts, and the media over their treatment of individuals. Many are
concerned that as tribes experience economic and political growth, they
will assert their jurisdiction over individuals in novel ways that may
implicate the fundamental rights of individuals. For the most part, the
prescriptions for tribes are unattractive. They either involve submitting
to further federal encroachments and greater dependency as Congress
intrudes on tribal self-government to protect individual rights, or they
involve fierce attachment to outmoded notions of the inviolable nature of
tribal sovereignty, coupled with an isolationist reluctance to comment on
government abuses committed by other tribes. Neither of these approaches
actively engages the sovereignty of tribes to allow native nations to forge
their own collective solution to the need for human rights accountability.
My hope is that the proposal described here will receive serious
consideration as a possible alternative. If successfully implemented,
tribes will be able to take a significant stride toward greater social justice
for their communities.
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